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Europe's  Gamble 
AFTER  THREE  DECADES,  the  quest  for  European monetary  unification 
may  well  bear fruit on  January 1,  1999.  On that date the European 
Union (EU) plans to introduce a common currency, the euro, in member 
states that satisfy specified macroeconomic  convergence  criteria. If the 
Economic  and Monetary Union (EMU) project is launched on time and 
with the maximum membership of eleven countries that currently seems 
possible,  it  will  create  a market of  close  to  300  million  consumers 
served by a common currency-roughly  10 percent more populous than 
the United  States.  Eventually  that market could comprise  twenty-five 
countries or more if EMU is successful  and the EU expands eastward. 
With only  a year to go,  however,  Europe's  political  establishment 
remains riven with doubt about several questions  central to the timely 
start and ultimate viability  of EMU.  What economic  and political  fac- 
tors will  determine the initial slate of EMU members? How will  mon- 
etary and fiscal policy operate within the planned euro zone? What will 
be the economic  impact of currency unification? Will domestic political 
realities become  increasingly  inconsistent  with the visions  of Europe's 
leaders, or will electorates come to love the euro? The procedure likely 
to be followed  in introducing the new European currency itself magni- 
fies the general uncertainty. Tightly circumscribed by obscurely  moti- 
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vated  provisions  of  EU  law,  it  inadvertently  heightens  the  risk  that 
political dissensions  will be propagated into financial market turbulence 
in 1998,  as they were during the ratification process for the Treaty on 
European Union  (the Maastricht treaty) in  1992-93. 
This paper reviews  the prospects for EMU roughly a year ahead of 
its scheduled starting date. There is now a vast literature analyzing  all 
aspects of European monetary unification,  and I attempt no comprehen- 
sive review of its conclusions. ' Rather, I focus on Europe's macroeco- 
nomic problems in the 1997-98  runup to the Maastricht treaty's dead- 
line,  and  ask  if  there  are  strong  reasons  to  believe  that EMU  will 
generate better macroeconomic  performance or other significant  eco- 
nomic  gains. 
My conclusion  is that the current uncertainty over  EMU flows  di- 
rectly from the internal macroeconomic  tensions of the main European 
countries, tensions that are unlikely to disappear as a result of the single 
currency alone.  EMU is a gamble that can be won in the long run only 
if it overcomes  the existing  political  stasis to force fundamental fiscal 
and labor market reform in its member states. If Europe's leaders cannot 
do  an end run around domestic  opposition  in the name of  European 
integration,  EMU could prove unstable. 
The outline  of the paper is as follows.  After placing European eco- 
nomic unification in historical perspective  and describing the timetable 
and entry criteria for EMU,  I review  the current macroeconomic  posi- 
tions  of  the possible  initial members.  I briefly discuss  the main gains 
that EMU's  promoters  have  identified,  and then focus  on  the  likely 
macroeconomic  costs  to member states  of  sharply diminished  sover- 
eignty in policymaking.  In evaluating those costs,  I argue that the larger 
states that are likely to form the core of EMU do not function efficiently 
as currency areas on their own. Distortions in labor and housing markets 
have perpetuated severe regional disparities in unemployment rates and 
helped to generate the pressures on public purses that figure so promi- 
nently in current uncertainties over EMU's  immediate future. 
Defenders  of  EMU  sometimes  argue that it costs  little  to give  up 
nominal  exchange  rate flexibility  in economies  subject to severe  real 
price  rigidities.  A  key  analytical  point of  the paper is  to dispute  the 
1. For surveys encompassing  a range of viewpoints, see Bean (1992), Gros and 
Thygesen  (1992), Eichengreen  (1993), Kenen  (1995), Taylor  (1995), Dornbusch  (1996), 
Feldstein  (1997), and Wyplosz (1997). Maurice Obstfeld  243 
generality of that claim.  Even when there is a small amount of nominal 
rigidity  in  the  system,  real  labor  market rigidities  of  the  types  that 
prevail in much of Europe may raise rather than reduce the macroeco- 
nomic  costs  of  a locked  exchange  rate.  I  also  argue,  however,  that 
knowledge  about how  devaluations  pass  through to  domestic  prices 
remains limited for European countries. 
Some countries gave up a great deal of their monetary independence 
long  ago,  through the Exchange  Rate Mechanism  (ERM) of the Euro- 
pean Monetary System (EMS).  In its current design,  EMU will circum- 
scribe countries'  options further, including on fiscal policy.  An impor- 
tant source of uncertainty in evaluating EMU is the counterfactual: if a 
single  currency were not on the agenda, how would economic  policies 
within the EU evolve?  Even on purely economic  grounds,  some  out- 
comes  might be worse than that of the Maastricht blueprint. 
The paper describes  the peculiar constraints on the choice  of  con- 
version rates for EMU member currencies against the euro. These con- 
straints will  inevitably  lead to rather close  coordination,  de facto or de 
jure, of the monetary policies  of future EMU members in the latter part 
of  1998.  Given the real possibility  of political  and economic  tremors, 
the need for monetary coordination might make exchange  markets sus- 
ceptible  to the type of turbulence that nearly derailed EMU in the early 
1990s.  Whether that disruptive potential is realized depends in part on 
the initial cast of EMU members and on the policies  that the EU coun- 
tries  follow.  I conclude  by  speculating  on the outcome  of  the initial 
EMU  selection  process  and on the implications  for the success  of the 
single  currency. 
The Road to EMU: Origins, Achievements, and Hopes 
The remarkable persistence of Europe's journey toward EMU makes 
no sense except in the perspective of the origins of European economic 
cooperation a half-century ago. U. S. aid for war-torn Europe under the 
Marshall  Plan,  announced  in June  1947,  included  as  a key  element 
insistence  on the collective  European allocation  of  aid monies.  That 
far-reaching provision  reflected the desire to build a united and inter- 
dependent Western Europe, prosperous and stable enough to preserve 
internal peace  while  withstanding  Soviet  subversion.  As the historian 244  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Alan Milward puts it: "The United States did not only intend to recon- 
struct western Europe economically,  but also  politically.'  '2  From the 
start, economic  cooperation  was a key pillar in the pursuit of political 
and strategic goals. 
Postwar  European Economic  Cooperation 
America's  aid initiative  led to the establishment,  in April  1948,  of 
the Organization for European Economic  Cooperation (OEEC),  which 
had the additional charge of promoting the liberalization  of trade and 
current account payments within Europe.  3 In the late 1940s Europe was 
caught in a web of currency inconvertibility  and bilateral trade arrange- 
ments.  As  late as  1957,  only the United  States,  Canada, Mexico,  and 
seven  small  Central American  and Caribbean countries  had formally 
accepted  their obligation  under Article  VIII of the International Mon- 
etary Fund agreement  to make their currencies  freely  convertible  on 
current  account  for  nonresidents.  The  European  Payments  Union 
(EPU),  set  up under OEEC  auspices  in  September  1950,  broke the 
convertibility  impasse  by furnishing  a multilateral clearing  house  for 
intra-European trade. Most European countries were able to announce 
Article  VIII convertibility  by  December  1958,  and some  reached de 
facto convertibility  earlier. 
Paralleling  the monetary cooperation implied by the EPU was more 
ambitious  economic  integration  within  a  subgroup  of  the  seventeen 
OEEC countries.  In April  1951,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy,  Bel- 
gium, Luxembourg,  and the Netherlands created the European Coal and 
Steel  Community  (ECSC),  a common  market in coal,  iron, and steel. 
In a recurring theme,  the project implicitly  called on Germany to inte- 
grate itself  more  deeply  with  other European countries  in return for 
partial restoration of  its prewar sovereignty,  extent,  and influence  in 
world affairs.  Thus Germany's  economic  interests were held hostage, 
to reassure public  opinion  in countries  that it had recently  occupied, 
notably,  France. The ECSC agreement ended eight decades of Franco- 
German conflict over the resource-rich regions on their common border, 
2.  Milward  (1984, p. 56). 
3.  See Cooper (1968, pp. 37-39)  on the OEEC's trade  liberalization  initiatives in 
Europe. The OEEC became the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Devel- 
opment (OECD) in 1961, at which time non-European  countries  became eligible for 
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paving  the way for the return of  German control of the Ruhr and the 
Saar.4 
In December  1957,  under the Treaty of Rome,  the six  members of 
the ECSC went much further and set up the European Economic  Com- 
munity (EEC),  which  over the years has expanded  its membership to 
encompass the fifteen members of the current EU.5 The Treaty of Rome 
called  for macroeconomic  policy  coordination  among EEC members, 
identifying  exchange  rates between  member states as a particular area 
of common concern.  In the 1960 European Monetary Agreement,  EEC 
members agreed to limit mutual exchange  rate movements  to  1.5 per- 
cent bands,  much narrower than the 4 percent bands allowed  for non- 
dollar exchange  rates under Bretton Woods  rules. 
German and Dutch revaluations in 1961, coupled with the impending 
inauguration of  a protected  common  market for cereals  in  1964,  led 
EEC leaders to focus  more intensely  on the possibly  disruptive effects 
of currency realignments within Europe.6 Among other concerns,  they 
feared that member countries would have to retain and tighten existing 
exchange  controls to repel future currency speculation,  frustrating the 
community's  long-term goal of enhanced capital market integration. As 
a step toward enhanced exchange  rate stability within Europe, the EEC 
Central  Bank  Governor's  Committee  was  created  in  1964.  But  the 
search for stability became urgent again only  in the late  1960s,  as the 
Bretton Woods  system of fixed dollar exchange rates came under pres- 
sure with the devaluations of sterling (not yet an EEC currency) in 1967 
and the French franc in 1969, and the second revaluation of the deutsche 
mark in 1969. 
Meeting in the Hague at the end of 1969, European Community (EC) 
heads of  state enunciated  for the first time the goal  of  economic  and 
monetary union. In 1971 the EC countries accepted proposals based on 
4.  Milward (1984, p. 407) observes: "The Franco-German  alliance has been the 
heart  of all subsequent  developments  in the European  Community  and has taken  on as 
permanent  an air as the hostility which preceded  it." The British  declined  to participate 
in the ECSC-another recurring  theme. 
5.  In 1967, the ECSC, the EEC, and the European  Atomic Energy Community 
merged  to form the European  Community  (EC). Since the ratification  of the Maastricht 
treaty  in 1993, the EC has been known  as the European  Union. As of October  1997, the 
complete  membership  roster  is Austria,  Belgium, Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Ireland,  Italy, Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, and  the 
United  Kingdom. 
6.  See Giavazzi and Giovannini  (1989, pp. 8-9). 246  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
the  1970 Werner Report,  which  laid out a three-stage  progression  to- 
ward the irrevocable  locking  of EC exchange  rates by  1980.7 But that 
plan, devised  when most dollar exchange  rates were still pegged,  soon 
became impracticable  in the economic  turbulence of the early  1970s. 
The operation of the European currency "snake" -a  network of mu- 
tually  pegged  exchange  rates  set  up  in  1972-did  little  to  promote 
comprehensive  exchange  stability in Europe, the only consistent  mem- 
bers being Germany and the Benelux  countries. 
From EMS to EMU 
The  European Monetary  System  began  operation  in March  1979, 
conceived  by French president Valery  Giscard d'Estaing  and German 
chancellor Helmut Schmidt.  Both leaders wished to counter the effects 
of U.S.  dollar instability  on intra-European exchange  rates. The EMS 
succeeded  in limiting  short-term nominal  exchange  rate fluctuations, 
but at the cost of continuing capital controls in most member countries 
and periodic  discrete  currency realignments.  A critical  feature,  how- 
ever,  was that the timing and size  of realignments became matters for 
group discussion  and decision.  This practice introduced an element of 
true coordination  into exchange  rate policy,  although fiscal and mone- 
tary policies  initially  remained much less constrained. 
The current drive toward EMU originated in the temporary economic 
upswing  in Europe after  1985,  when  the European Commission  (the 
executive  body  of  the EU),  under the presidency  of  Jacques  Delors, 
conceived  and successfully  promoted the " 1992"  single-market  com- 
pletion  initiative.  A key component  was the complete  liberalization  of 
capital  flows  (achieved  throughout the EU  when  Greece  removed  its 
restrictions in 1994).  This high degree of capital mobility  implied that 
even the suspicion  of an impending currency realignment could induce 
massive  speculative  cross-border  capital  flows.  Accordingly,  EMS 
members embarked on heavier intramarginal intervention and exchange 
rate-oriented monetary policies  in the late  1980s.  Realignments  were 
to be shunned. 
In this policy  environment,  the proposal by the Delors  Report of  a 
three-stage plan for the creation of a single  currency, to be issued by a 
European Central Bank (ECB),  found widespread  support. For coun- 
7.  See Giovannini  (1990, pp. 220-21). Maurice Obstfeld  247 
tries with credibility  problems,  a single  currency would lead to lower 
interest rates and possibly  to greater wage  discipline.  Speculation  on 
EU exchange rate changes would disappear. The European Commission 
subsequently  advanced  detailed  arguments  for  EMU  on  efficiency 
grounds.8 But from a political point of view,  the most potent motivating 
force behind support of the Delors proposals was the desire to end the 
preponderant control of EMS monetary policy  by the German Bundes- 
bank. Germany's partners in the ERM effectively  pegged  their curren- 
cies  to the deutsche  mark, just  as all had pegged  to the dollar under 
Bretton Woods.  Through the ECB,  however,  all EMU members,  not 
only Germany,  would have a voice  in setting interest rates. 
Why did Germany go  along with the plan? Apart from the German 
leadership's  belief  that it could design an EMU with a currency as hard 
as the deutsche  mark, there was a crucial political  deal.  Hans-Werner 
Sinn  notes  the  "open  secret"  that German support of  EMU  was  the 
price  of  French  acquiescence  in  the  reunification  of  East  and West 
Germany.9 Ironically,  the economic  consequences  of reunification may 
have undermined Germany's  hopes for a reliably hard euro. 
"Stage  One"  of the Delors plan started on July 1,  1990.  According 
to the report, this phase was to see  completion  of the internal market 
as  set  out  in  the  "1992"  initiative,  removal  of  remaining  exchange 
controls,  avoidance  of  currency  realignments,  and  accession  to  the 
ERM of then-nonmembers such as Britain, Portugal, and Spain.  Stage 
One was disrupted by the  1992-93  ERM crisis,  which was ignited by 
uncertainties over the ratification of the Maastricht treaty. 10  The treaty's 
ratification by all EU members was finally complete by November  1993, 
but only  after most  ERM currency bands had been  widened  to  ?  15 
percent (in August  1993) and subject to the United Kingdom and Den- 
mark having the option to stay outside EMU. 
In October  1990,  EU leaders (over British prime minister Margaret 
Thatcher's dissent)  agreed to start "Stage  Two"  of the Delors plan on 
January 1,  1994.  The  second  stage  was  intended to bring intensified 
policy  coordination,  culminating  in the establishment  of  a European 
System  of Central Banks (ESCB)  that would prepare for the introduc- 
8.  These arguments  are assembled  in "One Market,  One Money" (Commission  of 
the European  Communities,  1990). 
9.  Sinn (1996, p. 1) 
10. See Eichengreen  and Wyplosz (1993). 248  Brookings  Papers on Economnic  Activity, 2:1997 
tion of a single  currency in "Stage  Three"  of the plan. But as of  1990 
there was no detailed  road map for reaching Stage Three,  nor had the 
structure of the ESCB been agreed on. In December  1990 an intergov- 
ernmental conference  began  negotiations  on  amending  the Treaty of 
Rome,  which culminated  a year later in the Maastricht treaty. 
The Maastricht  Treaty and Its Implementation 
The document  that emerged  in December  1991 went far to address 
German concerns  about a weak European currency in Stage Three of 
the Delors plan. "  I The Maastricht treaty provides for the creation of an 
independent  (and largely  unaccountable)  European System  of  Central 
Banks, dedicated to the overriding goal of price stability and forbidden 
from directly  financing government  deficits.  At the system's  pinnacle 
is the European Central Bank, modeled largely on the Bundesbank but 
with a governing  board that includes representatives of all EMU mem- 
ber states.  As the treaty directs,  a European Monetary Institute (EMI) 
was set up in January 1994 to monitor convergence  during Stage Two 
and prepare  the  ground  for  the  ECB.  Finally,  the  treaty charts  the 
passage  from the enhanced  but still  vulnerable EMS of  Stage  One to 
the long-sought  monetary unification of  Stage Three.  A detailed  sce- 
nario for Stage  Two,  including  rigorous convergence  criteria that in- 
dividual countries must meet before admission to EMU, lies at the heart 
of  the Maastricht treaty. I describe  these  entry criteria after outlining 
the plan for the transition from Stage Two to Stage Three. 
The Maastricht treaty is usually interpreted as specifying  that Stage 
Three  will  begin  no  later  than January  1,  1999.  On  that date  (but 
effectively  on Monday,  January 4,  the first business  day after the New 
Year's  holiday),  national  central banks will  become  branches of  the 
ESCB under the direction of the ECB, the euro will be introduced, and 
the ESCB will  begin to conduct EMU's  single  monetary policy.  12 The 
11. Council of the European  Communities  (1992). 
12. According to the treaty, EMU might have started  before 1999. But at their 
December 1995 Madrid  summit, EU leaders set the start  of Stage Three at January  1, 
1999, because  convergence  as specified  in the treaty  appeared  remote  and the technical 
preparations  for EMU remained  incomplete.  The Maastricht  treaty  states  that  EMU will 
begin by that date, even if only a minority  of countries  meets the convergence  criteria 
(Council of the European  Communities, 1992, article 109j[4]). This provision was 
proposed by France to prevent indefinite postponement  of EMU. But Kenen (1995, Maurice Obstfeld  249 
Table 1.  Current  Timetable  for the Transition  to the Euro 
Early 1998  European Monetary Institute and European Commission prepare 
convergence assessments as basis for Ecofin Council qualified 
majority vote to identify convergent member states. National and 
European parliaments debate the convergence reports. 
May 1998  Council of Ministers (composed of heads of state or government) 
selects initial EMU entrants by qualified majority vote. The 
European Central Bank is established and the European Monetary 
Institute dissolved. 
January 1-4,  1999  Stage Three of EMU begins.  Conversion rates of national 
currencies into euro set. European System of Central Banks 
begins to conduct EMU monetary and foreign exchange policy in 
euro, but national currency notes and coin remain legal tender 
and private actors are still free to denominate in national currency 
units. 
January 1, 2002  Latest date for the introduction of euro notes and coins. 
July 1, 2002  Latest date for the withdrawal of national banknotes and coins; 
euro becomes sole legal tender. 
goal of the single currency must, however,  be attained in a very specific 
way. 
The choreography for the final year of Stage Two and the first years 
of  Stage  Three is intricate.  A description  is useful,  however,  for un- 
derstanding the political and technical hazards inherent in the transition 
to EMU.  Table  1 provides  a summary of  the likely  timetable.  In De- 
cember  1995  the Madrid summit of  EU  leaders  agreed that the final 
examination  of  convergence  before  Stage Three will  be completed  as 
early as possible  in 1998,  on the basis of  1997 data. According  to the 
Maastricht treaty, the EMI and the European Commission  are to report 
to the council  of economics  and finance ministers (the Ecofin Council) 
on whether individual EU members have fulfilled the convergence  cri- 
teria. 13 National parliaments-notably,  that of Germany-and  the Eu- 
p. 28) points out that the treaty's language  would seem to allow a later starting  date, 
provided  that it is set before the end of 1997. 
13. Member states make EU law through  the Council of Ministers, which must 
decide some questions unanimously  but can settle others through  weighted majority 
voting (weights are related  to population).  Sometimes  the Council  of Ministers  is com- 
posed of heads  of state  or government.  For many  purposes,  however, national  ministers 
of economics or finance  represent  their  countries  at council meetings. In such cases, the 
Council  of Ministers  is referred  to as the Ecofin Council. The powers of the European 250  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
ropean Parliament will debate these assessments.  On a recommendation 
of the European Commission,  the Ecofin Council will  take a weighted 
vote  to identify  the member states that qualify  for EMU and forward 
its own  recommendation  to the Council  of  Ministers.  On the basis of 
the Ecofin Council's  list and the opinion  of the European Parliament, 
the Council  of Ministers  will  determine the initial EMU entrants by a 
final weighted majority vote. The admission process should be complete 
by May  1998,  under current plans.  Countries excluded  from the first 
round will  be reconsidered for entry later-subject  to the same admis- 
sion process  and criteria as in 1998. 
Once  it is known  which  countries  will  adopt the euro in  1999,  the 
European  Central Bank  is  to  be  set  up  and the  European Monetary 
Institute dissolved.  However,  for the remainder of Stage Two the ECB 's 
sole  formal role is to prepare to take over in Stage Three.  Until then, 
national monetary policies  are to remain fully vested in national central 
banks. 
On January 1, 1999, the Ecofin Council will adopt the exchange rates 
at which member currencies are to be transformed into euro and Stage 
Three will  begin.  Importantly, the Madrid European Council accepted 
the EMI's  recommendation  of  a "changeover"  period of  up to three 
years,  during which  the new  currency units would  supersede  the old 
ones  in  defined  stages.  In  the  transition,  "private  economic  agents 
should  be free to use the European currency; on the other hand, they 
should not be obliged to do so before the deadline set for the completion 
of the changeover."  As a result, national currency denominations  will 
continue to be used for some time after January 1, 1999, and the ESCB 
will  be obliged  to exchange  national banknotes against the euro at par. 
However,  it  is  intended  that  national  currencies  will  be  "different 
expressions  of  what is economically  the same currency,"  in the same 
way as nickels  and dimes are "expressions"  of the dollar in the United 
States.-4  The  ESCB  will  conduct  its  monetary  and foreign  exchange 
policy  in euros.  Thus currency will be the sole component of the high- 
powered money stock to remain (transitionally) denominated in national 
units.  Euro notes  and coins  will  be introduced only  after Stage Three 
Commission include initiating legislation for approval  by the Council of Ministers. 
"European  Council" refers to the periodic summit meetings of EU heads of state or 
government  and the president  of the European  Commission. 
14. European  Monetary  Institute  (1995, pp. 1-2). Maurice Obstfeld  251 
has begun, but by January 1, 2002 at the latest. National currency notes 
and coins  may remain in circulation until July  1, 2002. 
Convergence  Criteria 
The convergence  criteria for admission  to the single  currency have 
been among the most debated aspects  of  the Maastricht treaty. There 
are four primary criteria: 
PRICES.  In the year before  the examination  for admission,  the con- 
sumer price inflation rate must be no more than 1.5 percent above the 
average of those of the three EU member states with the lowest inflation 
rates. 
GOVERNMENT  DEFICITS  AND  DEBT.  Neither actual nor planned general 
government  deficits  may exceed  3 percent of  GDP,  unless  the deficit 
ratio has been declining  and has "reached  a level  that comes  close  to 
the reference  value"  of  3 percent,  or unless  the discrepancy  is  "ex- 
ceptional  and temporary and the ratio remains close  to the reference 
value."  Government debt should not exceed  60 percent of GDP,  "un- 
less the ratio is sufficiently  diminishing  and approaching the reference 
value at a satisfactory  pace."'5 
EXCHANGE  RATES.  For at least two years before the examination,  the 
country should have observed the "normal"  fluctuation margins of the 
ERM,  without devaluing  on its own  initiative  against the currency of 
another ERM member. 
LONG-TERM  NOMINAL  INTEREST  RATES.  In the year before  examina- 
tion,  the  long-term  interest  rate must  be,  on  average,  no  more  than 
2 percent above the average of those of the three EU members with the 
lowest  inflation rates. 
These four criteria provide necessary but not sufficient preconditions 
for entry to EMU.  In addition,  they must be satisfied in a sustainable 
manner. In judging sustainability as well as convergence,  the European 
Commission  and EMI can consider  other factors,  such as current ac- 
count  imbalances  or wage  pressure.  Finally,  there is  an institutional 
requirement: each member state is obliged to amend its national central 
bank statute to make it compatible  with that of the ESCB. 
The overriding motivation for these criteria is to ensure that the single 
15. Council of the European  Communities  (1992, article 104c[2], p. 27). For the 
deficit, the treaty  specifies the reference  level as 3, not 3.0, percent. 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
currency will be a hard currency. Although there has been considerable 
academic debate over the necessity  (and sufficiency)  of the criteria for 
meeting  that objective,  the  main practical  intent was  to  exclude  the 
(then)  high-inflation  EMS  members-such  as  Italy,  Portugal,  and 
Spain-until  they  had lived  for  some  time  with  monetary  and fiscal 
rectitude and thereby proved the sincerity of their conversion to German 
"stability  culture."''6 The convergence  provisions  thus made the loss 
of the deutsche mark more acceptable to German public opinion and to 
the Bundesbank,  which has embraced EMU cautiously.  In addition,  a 
strand of  official  opinion  (popular especially  among central bankers) 
agreed  that  governments  needed  a  sharp external  prod  to  move  on 
internal economic  reform. In 1991 Italy's  government deficit was run- 
ning more than 10 percent of GDP, Portugal's inflation rate was running 
more than 12 percent per year, Spain's current account deficit was above 
3 percent  of  GDP,  and first-round EMU  membership  for these  three 
countries  appeared a remote  prospect.  By  mid-1997,  however,  their 
chances  looked  very different. 
Macroeconomic Trends and Prospects for EMU 
Whether EMU goes  ahead on time,  and if so,  with what members, 
will  depend  in part on the formal convergence  criteria and in part on 
economic  and political variables still difficult to forecast. The May 1998 
decisions  about entry will  be intensely  political.  But their legality  and 
public  acceptance  require a plausibly  close  linkage  to  the economic 
guidelines  laid down  in the Maastricht treaty. Any  interpretations in- 
voked in May  1998 will be binding precedents on future admissions  to 
EMU,  making it all the more urgent that most EU members view  the 
selection  procedure as fair and legally  justifiable.  Therefore an evalu- 
ation of the likely  shape and near-term prospects  of EMU must begin 
with the convergence  criteria. 
Exchange  Rates,  Inflation, Interest Rates,  and Fiscal  Variables 
Although  some  minor  questions  of  interpretation  remain,  it  is 
unlikely  that any country will be excluded  from EMU directly because 
16. For the academic  debate, see sources  cited in note 1. Maurice Obstfeld  253 
Figure  1.  Nominal  Exchange  Rates against  the Deutsche  Mark,  1987-97: 
France, Italy, Portugal,  Spain 
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Source:  Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development,  Fiscal Positions anzd  Buisinzess  CYcles  on Diskette, 1997/1. 
For 1997, figures  are OECD forecasts. 
a. Exchange  rates  are in home currency  units per deutsche mark,  so that an increase  in the index represents  a depreciation. 
of  the  behavior  of  its  exchange  or  inflation  rates-absent  a sudden 
speculative  currency crisis on the order of  1992-93.  The same may be 
said of long-term interest rates, given current data, although these rates 
are heavily  influenced  by the current market view  that the EMU  that 
emerges  from the May  1998 meeting  of the Council  of Ministers will 
be broad. Figures  1 and 2 together show exchange rate behavior against 
the deutsche mark during 1987-97  for eight contenders for early EMU 
membership  (the  Netherlands,  whose  guilder  has  remained  tightly 
linked to the mark since  the early  1980s,  and Luxembourg,  which  is 
already  in  a currency  union  with  Belgium,  are not  shown).  France, 
Belgium,  and Austria have followed  the mark closely  over the period 
shown,  with only transitory fluctuations of more than a couple  of per- 
cent from ERM central rates.  (Austria's  remarkably rigid  peg  to the 
mark long predates its 1995 entry into the EU.)  The Portuguese escudo 254  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 2. Nominal  Exchange  Rates against the Deutsche  Mark, 1987-97: 
Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland 
Index,  1987  =  Ooa 
140  Finland 
130  - 
120  - 
110  / 
/  ~~~~~~~~Austria 
100 
Belgium 
1988  1990  1992  1994  1996 
Source: See figure 1. 
a. Exchange rates  are in home currency  units per deutsche mark,  so that  an increase  in the index represents  a depreciation. 
and Spanish peseta  have been fairly stable against the mark in  1996- 
97,  their movements  well  within the current  + 15 percent bands of the 
ERM.  Ireland's currency has also remained within its ERM band, but 
it has been much stronger than its central rate against the mark in 1996 
and 1997.  In bids to satisfy  a strict interpretation of the exchange  rate 
criterion, Finland joined  and Italy rejoined the ERM late in 1996.  (The 
lira  appreciated  sharply  during  1996  as  a result  of  Italy's  moves  to 
qualify for EMU.)  If "normal"  fluctuation limits are interpreted as the 
current ERM bands, and Finland and Italy are considered to have been 
in the ERM for long  enough,  all of these  countries will  likely  satisfy 
the exchange  rate criterion. 
The current configuration of real exchange rates gives  little evidence 
of  major misalignments  among  the eleven  countries  that might enter 
EMU in 1999.  But the usual problems arise in making this assessment: 
different measures of the real exchange  rate give  somewhat contradic- Maurice Obstfeld  255 
Figure  3.  Current  Account  Balances,  Selected  EU Countries,  1997 
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tory indications,  structural shifts may bring permanent changes in equi- 
librium rates,  and it is therefore not clear how to pick an appropriate 
base  year.  In its  November  1996  convergence  assessment  (based  on 
data through September 1996),  the EMI cautiously concluded that most 
of the countries'  real exchange  rates were not far from their levels  in 
1987-a  year of approximate internal and external equilibrium-except 
those of Finland and Italy, which had depreciated. 17 Figure 3 illustrates 
the absence  of big current account deficits  among these countries.'8 
The four countries  that almost  certainly  will  not join  EMU on the 
first round,  shown  in figure 4,  present interesting contrasts.  Denmark 
has  followed  the  mark as  closely  as  Belgium,  whereas  the  Greek 
drachma has depreciated steadily,  slowing down its fall against the mark 
only  recently.  Sterling  and the Swedish  krona have both appreciated 
since  1995. Of these countries,  only Denmark is a member of the ERM. 
17. European  Monetary  Institute  (1996, p. 40). Italy's return  to the ERM  in Novem- 
ber 1996 erased  its gain in competitiveness,  however. 
18. For alternative  assessments  of real exchange rates, see Sinn (1996) and Begg 
and  others  (1997). 256  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure  4. Nominal  Exchange  Rates against the Deutsche  Mark, 1987-97: 
Denmark,  Greece,  Sweden,  United Kingdom 
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a. Exchange rates  are in home currency  units per deutsche mark,  so that  an increase  in the index represents  a depreciation. 
Britain would have been forced to pursue looser monetary policies  had 
it rejoined  the ERM in  1996,  although part of  the recent strength of 
sterling stems from market fears of a "soft"  euro (a factor that has also 
buoyed the Swiss  franc and the U.S.  dollar). 
Inflation convergence,  illustrated in figures 5 to 7,  has essentially 
been  achieved  by all first-round aspirants.  Italy,  Spain,  and Portugal 
are the latest  to bring their inflation rates within  a point or so of  the 
system's  best performing countries.  For 1997,  it appears that Finland 
and Luxembourg (both with a predicted standard consumer price index 
[CPI] inflation rate of  1.5 percent) and Belgium  and France (both with 
predicted inflation of  1.6 percent) will  be in front. 19  Even among non- 
19. Predicted  inflation  rates are for private  consumption  deflators,  as forecasted  by 
the OECD  on the basis of national  sources  (OECD  Economic  Outlook  61, 1997, p. A 18). 
However, before application  of the treaty's  price stability  criterion,  national  figures  are 
to be adjusted  by the EU's statistical  arm, Eurostat,  for easier comparison.  For 1995- Maurice Obstfeld  257 
Figure 5.  Consumer  Price Inflation,  1987-97:  France,  Germany,  Italy, Portugal, 
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aspirants,  only  Greece  could  be definitively  excluded  on the inflation 
criterion,  and it  has reduced  its  inflation  rate dramatically  since  the 
early  1990s.  However,  a country's  inflation  performance  could  be 
judged "unsustainable"  if, despite low 1997 CPI inflation, its economy 
shows  signs of future inflationary pressures; for example,  accelerating 
growth in unit labor costs. 
The rationale for the long-term interest rate test is murky. This test 
is likely  to be satisfied  automatically  by countries that the market be- 
lieves  will  enter EMU;  but conversely,  it could  in itself  disqualify  a 
country  simply  on  the  basis  of  market beliefs,  even  if  all  the  other 
96, Eurostat  has calculated  adjusted  "interim" indexes of consumer  prices (IICPs). To 
cover 1997 it will publish more definitive "harmonized"  CPIs. For example, Italy's 
CPI inflation  rate for the twelve months ending in September  1996 was 4.2  percent; 
IICP inflation was 4.7  percent. For Germany, the corresponding  numbers  were 1.5 
percent  and 1.3 percent, respectively. See European  Monetary  Institute  (1996, tables 
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Figure  6. Consumer  Price Inflation,  1987-97: Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland, 
the Netherlands 
Percent  per  year 
6  Finland 
Ireland 
5  I 
4  I 
"...Belgium 
I  l%  l 
1988  1990  1992  1994  1996 
Source:  See figure 1. 
criteria are met.20 Table 2 shows the positions  of EU countries on long- 
term interest rates.  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Luxembourg, 
Germany, and the Netherlands will easily  meet the interest rate test. In 
all likelihood,  so will Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, but a sharp adverse 
turn of  market expectations  could  blow  them off  course.  Italy  looks 
more  marginal,  its  fate  most  closely  linked  to  the market's  perhaps 
impressionable  view-although  its October 1997 rate is well below the 
period average shown in the last column of table 2. 
20.  Kenen (1995, p. 130) suggests that this feature  reflects  the true purpose  of the 
criterion:  to serve as a market-based  "reality check" on official convergence  assess- 
ments. Since there  are no longer  capital  controls  within  the EU, there  are three  ways in 
which a country  otherwise  sure  to join EMU  permanently  could fail the interest  rate  test, 
none of which is too plausible  (I assume  that  interest  rates  are corrected  for differences 
in national  tax rates). The first  two are  an expectation  of a debt  default  by its government 
or a very illiquid  market  in its debt. The third  is the expectation  of a very big devaluation 
before January  1, 1999. Maurice Obsifeld  259 
Figure  7.  Consumer  Price Inflation,  1987-97: Denmark,  Greece,  Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Percent  per  year 
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Technically,  the fiscal test requires that the Ecofin Council finds that 
a country does  not  have  an  "excessive  deficit"  on  the  basis  of  the 
government debt and deficit conditions  described above.  These  deter- 
minations are part of the mechanism for EU policy coordination in Stage 
Two,  and currently Denmark,  Finland,  Ireland, Luxembourg,  and the 
Netherlands are the only  EU states not subject to an excessive  deficit 
ruling.  They  will  automatically  meet  the EMU  fiscal  test  unless  the 
Ecofin Council changes their status early in 1998; conversely,  no other 
country can be deemed fiscally  convergent  unless the council  formally 
revokes  its prior finding of  an excessive  deficit after evaluating  1997 
fiscal data. 
The debt component  of  the fiscal criterion received  relatively  little 
open discussion  until July 1997. But then the French, seeking to counter 
German pique at the new Socialist government's  seeming unwillingness 
to  strive  for  a  strict  deficit  target of  3.0  percent  of  GDP,  began  to 260  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Table 2.  Long-Term  Nominal  Interest  Rates,  Selected  European 
Countries,  1995-97a 
Percent 
Country  1995  1996b  1997c 
Austria  7.1  6.5  6.0 
Belgium  7.5  6.7  6.1 
Denmark  8.3  7.4  6.7 
Finland  8.8  7.4  6.4 
France  7.5  6.6  5.9 
Germany  6.9  6.3  5.9 
Greece  17.4  15.1  9.2 
Ireland  8.3  7.5  6.8 
Italy  12.2  10.3  8.0 
Luxembourg  7.6  7.0  5.9 
Netherlands  6.9  6.3  5.8 
Portugal  11.5  9.4  7.3 
Spain  11.3  9.5  7.4 
Sweden  10.2  8.5  7.2 
United Kingdom  8.3  8.0  7.6 
Reference valued  9.7  8.7  8.1 
Source: For 1995 and 1996, data are from European  Monetary Institute  (1996, tables 7.1-7.15);  for 1997, data on national 
interest rates are obtained from the EMI. 
a. Harmonized national representative long-term interest rates on central government debt. The particular  securities used 
for calculation  are chosen  by member states and can correspond either to a benchmark bond or to a sample of  bonds. 
Securities must have maturities of close to ten years and be highly liquid. Yields are measured gross of tax. 
b. Twelve-month average ending September 1996. 
c.  Twelve-month average ending June 1997. For Greece, June 1997 value is given. 
d. Calculated as 2 percentage points plus the unweighted average of interest rates in the three EU countries with the year's 
lowest inflation rates. For 1997, author's estimate is given,  rather  than an official EMI value. 
murmur that whereas  France would  pass  a strict debt test  for  1997, 
Germany probably would not. In fact, France will barely pass: its 1997 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  forecast  by  the  Organisation  of  Economic  Co- 
operation  and Development  (OECD)  at around 58  percent.2'  Almost 
none of the potential first-round EMU members has a gross debt below 
the reference  value of 60 percent of GDP,  however,  and there is great 
divergence  in the numbers,  ranging from Belgium,  with  around 127 
percent of GDP forecast for 1997,  to Luxembourg,  with 6.4  percent of 
GDP in 1996. 
There are several explanations for the lack of attention given to debt 
levels,  as  compared  with  deficits.  One  focuses  on  Belgium,  which 
would  have  to  be  excluded  (probably  for  many  years)  on  any  strict 
application of the debt criterion. Belgium  has shadowed the mark since 
21.  OECD Economic Outlook  61,  1997, p. A68. All other national  debt data and 
forecasts in this paper  are taken  from this source. Maurice Obsifeld  261 
the days of the currency snake, has not devalued significantly  in over a 
decade,  is a founding  EU member,  and is the seat of the EU bureauc- 
racy.  Moreover,  while  its public debt-to-output ratio exceeds  even  It- 
aly's  123 percent,  the absolute level of potential financial liability  that 
its debt would create for EMU is much smaller than would be entailed 
by  the  Italian debt.  Thus  no one  wishes  to follow  a proceedure  that 
would  exclude  Belgium.22  The  second  explanation  is  legalistic:  the 
Maastricht  treaty  specifies  60  percent  as  a reference  value,  but-in 
contrast to the language describing the deficit-does  not say that coun- 
tries must be  "close  to"  the target. Thus Belgium,  whose  debt stood 
at 137 percent of GDP in 1993,  may be judged to have made sufficient 
progress  in debt reduction  to qualify.  A  third view  is  that for many 
countries,  net public  debt is far below  gross public debt (the concept 
on which,  puzzlingly,  the Maastricht treaty focuses).  The question  of 
gross debt therefore appears less urgent. Finally,  there is the "conspir- 
acy of silence."  High-debt countries have nothing to gain by bringing 
up the issue,  while Germany and its allies may wish to keep it in reserve 
as the ultimate weapon to block Italy's admission.  It remains to be seen 
whether scrutiny of debt levels  will intensify  as May 1998 approaches. 
So  far,  however,  the  deficit  component  of  the  fiscal  criterion  has 
been the trial by fire for most countries,  even those with the best infla- 
tion records. It is also the issue around which concerns about "sustain- 
ability"  are likely  to hover,  given the widespread practice of cosmetic 
accounting.  Figures  8 and 9  illustrate  trends in fiscal  deficits.23 The 
magnitudes of these countries' efforts to reduce measured public deficits 
since  the mid-1990s  are evident. 
On present data,  it appears that Finland,  Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg (not pictured, but likely to have a government surplus 
this year) will  avoid excessive  deficit rulings by the Ecofin Council  in 
1998.  Austria,  Belgium,  Portugal,  and Spain are expected  to come  in 
close  to 3 percent-so  close,  given  projected  1998 budgets,  that they 
22.  As Thygesen (1993, p. 17) puts it: "The budgetary  criteria  . . . are unlikely to 
be applied  mechanically  to bar countries  which have long observed  the rigid discipline 
of the normal  margins  in the EMS, from  entry  into the final stage." Belgium meets this 
description,  but Italy, Portugal,  and Spain  do not. 
23.  The 1997 figures  are forecasts  by the OECD. All forecasts  concerning  the 1997 
Maastricht  deficit numbers  remain  highly uncertain  at this point, not only because  of the 
usual economic factors, but also because new rulings  from Brussels  could alter the set 
of items that  governments  must include in calculating  deficits. 262  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure  8. Public Sector Deficits, 1987-97: France, Germany,  Italy, Portugal,  Spain 
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will very likely escape their present excessive  deficit status and thereby 
meet the Maastricht fiscal criterion.24 
The most problematic cases are those of Germany, France, and Italy. 
Germany's  1997 deficit may well exceed  the 3 percent reference value. 
In France, the election  of a Socialist  government in the spring of  1997 
and the French public's  obvious discontent with budget cuts created the 
temporary impression that France would widely overshoot the 3 percent 
mark. Despite  its campaign  promises,  however,  the new  government 
of  Prime  Minister  Lionel  Jospin  abruptly changed  course  and made 
EMU  a  priority.  France's  deficit  is  likely  to  exceed  the  Maastricht 
24.  Of the countries  currently  subject  to excessive deficit rulings, Belgium had the 
lowest 1996 deficit, at 3.4 percent  of GDP. Belgium's debt situation  is unusually  bad, 
but  it might  nonetheless  prove  awkward  for the Ecofin  Council  both  to rescind  Belgium's 
excessive deficit ruling and to do so for countries  with 1997 or projected  1998 public 
deficits of 3.4 percent  or above. Maurice Obsifeld  263 
Figure 9.  Public Sector Deficits,  1987-97:  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland, 
the Netherlands 
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reference value for 1997, but probably not by much. Italy seems poised 
to come in well under 4 percent-perhaps  close to the 3 percent target.25 
Italy has accomplished  its dramatic fiscal  about-face  through some 
genuine  tightening,  but also  through imaginative  gimmickry,  such as 
the one-year-only  "Eurotax."  However,  its position  is unusually sen- 
25.  In June 1997 the OECD predicted  that the French,  German,  and Italian  public 
sector deficits for 1997 would all be 3.2 percent  of GDP (OECD  Economic  Outlook  61, 
1997, p. A33). After the publication  of these forecasts, a decision by the European 
Commission  gave Germany  the right  to exclude  sizable  hospital  expenses  from  its official 
deficit figure. Also,  the Jospin government, presenting  its budget late in September 
1997, forecast a 3.1  percent deficit for France for 1997. For Italy, the OECD has 
predicted  a 1998 deficit of 3.8 percent, which could provide ammunition  for charges 
that  its 1997 fiscal performance  is unsustainable.  As noted  below, however, interest  rate 
effects will make Italy's 1998 deficit very sensitive to the outcome of its bid for first- 
round  entry  to EMU. Furthermore,  new pension  and welfare  reform  measures  advanced 
by the government  of Prime Minister Romano Prodi would substantially  reduce the 
planned  1998 deficit. 264  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Figure 10. Unemployment  Rates, 1970-97: France, Germany,  Italy, Portugal,  Spain 
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sitive  to interest rates, and its longer term interest rates have declined 
as expectations  that Italy  will  enter EMU  in  1999  have  risen.26 The 
country  has  a large  government  primary  surplus,  projected  to  be 
4.9  percent of GDP in 1997,  according to the OECD.  The OECD also 
projects Italian government net debt interest payments to be 8. 1 percent 
of GDP in  1997.  Given  Italy's  high debt-to-GDP  ratio, a market con- 
viction  that EMU entry is imminent  could  alter its  1997 deficit  ratio 
significantly.  The  effect  would  depend  on  the government's  ability 
to refinance  its debt quickly  at maturities  most  sensitive  to expecta- 
tions. 
For both France and Germany,  rising unemployment  coupled  with 
rather generous  unemployment  support systems  have been at the core 
of  the  difficulties  in  reaching  a deficit  target of  3  percent  in  1997. 
Figures  10  and  11 show  unemployment  rates for  ten  potential  first- 
round EMU members.  European unemployment  is much more persist- 
26.  See Begg and others  (1997). Maurice Obsifeld  265 
Figure 11. Unemployment  Rates, 1970-97: Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  Ireland, 
the Netherlands 
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ent than that of  the United  States,  at the national,  regional,  and even 
individual  levels  (as measured by the much greater incidence  of long- 
term unemployment  in most of Europe).  Thus increases  in unemploy- 
ment rates lead to large and persistent budgetary drains. 
From this perspective,  it is  not surprising that some  countries  are 
currently finding it difficult to meet the Maastricht deficit target. Fiscal 
tightening  in preparation for EMU has tended to raise unemployment 
and thus benefit payments,  leaving  a diminished  net positive  effect  on 
government  budgets.  Countries where unemployment  has come  down 
since the early  1990s-Finland,  the Netherlands,  Ireland-are  in rela- 
tively  good  fiscal  shape.  Countries where unemployment  is high and 
rising-France,  Italy, Germany (with especially  high unemployment in 
the east)-are  having a hard time adjusting. Aside  from the budgetary 
repercussions,  high  unemployment  places  many  countries  in  an un- 
comfortable  position  from which  to  enter monetary union.  This  was 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
Sweden's  primary  reason  in  1997  for  deciding  not  to  enter  EMU 
in  1  999.27 
The Political  Context of the Transition to EMU 
Uncertainty  over  the start of  EMU will  not disappear with the an- 
nouncement  of  the  first members,  especially  if  that group is  broad. 
EMU may have to clear some high political  hurdles between  May and 
December  1998 to reach the finish line  on time.  The greatest hazards 
originate  in Germany,  but they have been magnified by opposition  to 
further domestic  budget cuts in France. 
The intransigent budget deficits in Germany and France have proven 
to  be  a  major embarrassment  to  German chancellor  Helmut  Kohl's 
government,  and perhaps the greatest threat to an on-time departure for 
EMU.  Germany promoted the deficit criterion in part to exclude  Italy 
from the first wave of members.  Sharply rising German unemployment 
in 1996-97,  coupled with unwillingness  of Chancellor Kohl's coalition 
partners to approve new tax increases,  has left Germany's  anticipated 
1997  deficit  uncomfortably  close  to  that of  Italy.  To  make  matters 
worse,  France's  deficit prospects resemble Germany's,  and EMU can- 
not succeed  as a European institution unless it includes these two core 
players.  But if both France and Germany are in, the Germans may have 
little basis for a push to exclude  Italy. 
Germany's  fiscal  predicament  led,  in  the  spring  of  1997,  to  the 
government's  desperate and unsuccessful  attempt to revalue the Bun- 
desbank's  gold reserves and claim the capital gain as a 1997 budgetary 
credit. The main effects  of that episode  were to outrage German public 
27.  On Sweden, see Calmfors  and others  (1997). In 1996 Sweden's unemployment 
rate was near 8 percent. Since Sweden has so far chosen not to join the ERM, it may 
not be in compliance  with the exchange  rate  requirement-as will emerge  from  the May 
1998 admission decision-and  therefore  may not be legally obliged to join EMU in 
1999, despite the likelihood  that it will satisfy nearly  all the other  convergence  criteria 
in 1997. (Sweden's debt will be somewhat  above the 60 percent  reference  value, but no 
more so than that of the Netherlands.)  Unlike Britain  and Denmark,  however, Sweden 
has not negotiated an opt-out from EMU. At this time, therefore, the legality of its 
announcement  that  it will not be in the first  wave of EMU  members  is doubtful,  although 
there is little sentiment  within  the EU (except in Finland)  for forcing Sweden in against 
its will.  Another potential legal bar to Sweden's entry is the statute of the Sveriges 
Riksbank, which remains inconsistent with that of the ESCB. Legislation has been 
introduced  to change the charter  of the Swedish central  bank, but the constitutionally 
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opinion,  alienate the Bundesbank further, undermine Germany's stand- 
ing as a critic of the accounting  virtuosity of other countries,  and en- 
courage some German politicians  to call openly for delaying EMU.  At 
the present time, Germany's last hope is that the European Commission 
and the EMI judge Italy's  fiscal achievements  in 1997 to be unsustain- 
able or disqualify  it from membership on some  other ground,  for ex- 
ample,  its high public debt ratio.28 
A broad EMU,  including  large countries  that have  not strictly  re- 
spected the deficit reference value,  would seriously raise the possibility 
of a German constitutional  crisis.  As a result,  Germany might call for 
delay.  Like  their central bankers,  many German voters  fear that the 
euro will  be a softer currency than the mark, especially  if it has to be 
managed in collaboration with Italy as well as France.29  Upon ratifying 
the Maastricht treaty,  the German Bundestag  claimed  competence  to 
judge  whether Germany should proceed to Stage Three,  stating that it 
would  accept  only  a strict interpretation of  the convergence  criteria. 
The German Constitutional  Court subsequently  endorsed the Bundes- 
tag's  position  that it could  block  German participation in EMU if the 
convergence  criteria were loosely  applied.30 Opposition in the Bundes- 
tag,  especially  if inspired by the open misgivings  of the Bundesbank, 
might lead the Constitutional Court to rule that the German government 
would violate the constitution by joining EMU.3' The Maastricht treaty 
makes no allowance  for individual countries to block or withdraw from 
28.  A decision to disqualify Italy based on its government's  debt might, in turn, 
lead to the disqualification  of Belgium, and to the dissolution  of Belgium-Luxembourg 
currency  link established  in the 1920s. 
29.  The May 1997 Eurobarometer  survey (Standard  Eurobarometer  46) carried  out 
by the European  Commission  showed that 39 percent  of Germans  polled favored the 
single currency  while 42 percent  were against  it. In Austria  and  Finland,  both  also likely 
first-round  members, there was greater  opposition to EMU than support. In France, 
supporters  outnumbered  opponents  by 55 percent  to 30 percent.  Italy  showed  the greatest 
net support  for EMU:  73 percent  for and  only 11 percent  against.  In the December  1996 
survey, 59 percent  of those polled in France  supported  EMU while only 22 percent  were 
against  it. 
30.  Kenen (1995, pp. 26,  166). Steinherr  (1994, pp. 252-53)  reprints  an excerpt 
from the court's ruling in English  translation. 
31.  The Bundesbank's  skepticism  over proceeding  with EMU in 1999 is no secret. 
Bundesbank  council members  have been openly critical  and the bank's  Monthly  Report 
has contained a series of warnings about German  fiscal preparedness  for EMU, the 
dangers  of basing policy decisions on "structural"  rather  than  actual  government  defi- 
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EMU in the event of a domestic political  impasse,  but there might well 
be a delay. 
Chancellor  Kohl will  be running for reelection  in the fall of  1998, 
shortly before  Stage Three is set to begin.  It already seems  likely  that 
the opposition  platform  will  call  for delay,  arguing that a hard euro 
requires waiting until the convergence  criteria are strictly met. This is 
not an anti-EMU  platform,  which  would  still  be beyond  the political 
pale in Germany, but rather, it is a stalling tactic based on the argument 
that EMU must be  "done  right."  Whether the deficits of the member 
government are 3.0 percent or 3.5 percent of GDP a year ahead of EMU 
can make no real difference to the anti-inflation resolve of the European 
Central Bank. The true subtext of the German opposition  is that delay 
will  show  up the  Italians'  consolidation  efforts  as  a sham,  allowing 
EMU to start later without them. 
Opposition  to the single  currency may grow elsewhere-as  it has in 
France-if  EMU becomes  identified  in voters'  minds with a rollback 
of the welfare  state and high unemployment. 
Benefits and Costs of the Monetary Union 
The hazards that bedevil the final months of EMU's gestation reflect 
not only contending political  value judgments,  but also genuine uncer- 
tainty about the purely economic  gains and losses  to be expected  under 
the single  currency.  On the one hand, savings on transaction costs  and 
economies  of resource allocation are counted among the likely benefits. 
Some of these efficiency  gains result from the single  currency's effect 
on the political  sustainability  of the single  market. 
On the other hand,  national monetary and fiscal  policies  are likely 
to  be  constrained  further.  The  implications  of  this  development  are 
ambiguous  and will  differ  across  countries.  In his  work on optimum 
currency areas, Robert Mundell explains  the macroeconomic  stability 
cost of giving  up the exchange  rate as a mode of adjustment to macro- 
economic  shocks  when nominal wages  and prices are sticky.32 A geo- 
graphical  unit  characterized  by  high  labor mobility,  a high  level  of 
interregional trade, and a low incidence  of region-specific  demand and 
32.  Mundell (1961). Maurice Obstfeld  269 
supply shocks might give up separate regional monies  at minimal cost. 
To the extent that these conditions  fail in Europe-certainly,  intra-EU 
labor mobility remains very low-exchange  rate adjustment would con- 
tinue  to  be  the  easiest  way  to  move  international  relative  prices  to 
equilibrium following  a shock. 
Imagine,  for example,  an unexpected  permanent fall in Spanish ag- 
gregate demand that the other EMU countries escape.  An idiosyncratic 
national real shock such as this would not cause much depreciation of 
the euro against outside currencies, nor would it trigger monetary easing 
by the ECB. If EMU were an optimum currency area, Spanish workers 
would migrate to other EMU countries rather than facing unemployment 
at home.  In reality,  however,  out-migration  would  be  minimal,  and 
unemployment  would  therefore persist until Spanish prices  and costs 
had fallen enough  to create an export-led  recovery.  The deflation pro- 
cess  is  a lengthy  one.  With its own  currency,  Spain would  have  the 
option  of  altering  relative  international prices  more quickly  through 
depreciation,  at lower cost in terms of unemployment.33 
In principle,  fiscal policy  can supplement monetary policy  by allow- 
ing a richer set of  goals.  However,  monetary and fiscal policy  can be 
abused,  and have been by some EU countries,  so there is a case for at 
least some restraints on national policy  discretion. 
Quantification of the various costs  and benefits of a single  currency 
ranges from difficult  to impossible.  Even the European Commission's 
remarkably comprehensive  study,  "One  Market, One Money,"  shies 
away from a bottom-line  cost-benefit  analysis.34 A brief summary of a 
few  lessons  learned  since  that  1990  report is  nonetheless  useful  in 
evaluating  the major challenges  that EMU will  face. 
Efficiency Gains 
Perhaps the most obvious  gain to be had from EMU is the saving on 
currency transaction costs.  "One Market, One Money"  illustrates how 
an itinerant tourist could  lose  nearly half of  a given  original  sum by 
making a "round trip"  through ten European currencies.  The loss  re- 
33.  For depreciation  to be effective, it must  be at least partially  unanticipated;  that 
is, it must  come in response  to an  economic  shock  not yet fully absorbed  into  the structure 
of domestic  nominal  prices and wages. 
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flects commissions  and fees only.  Together with additional costs,  such 
as internal accounting  costs  and the interest cost  of clearing  lags,  the 
transaction loss entailed by multiple currencies might be as high as 0.3 
to 0.4 percent of GDP per year.35  European financial institutions already 
bemoan the current and prospective  loss  of foreign exchange  business 
due to the euro-although  their layoffs,  which induce foreign exchange 
traders  to  find more  socially  productive  jobs,  are a primary  route 
through which the savings  identified by the European Commission  are 
to be reaped! 
Critics of fluctuating exchange rates usually hold that direct currency 
conversion costs are a relatively minor component of the efficiency  loss 
due to  multiple  currencies.  More  serious  is the alleged  disruption to 
international trade and investment  from the unpredictability of  future 
real  and  nominal  exchange  rates.  Econometric  studies  of  effects  of 
short-term exchange  rate volatility  on trade and investment show slight 
negative  effects,  but the results  are hardly indicative  of  large  costs. 
Longer term misalignments  in real exchange  rates are arguably more 
disruptive.36  A  newer  econometric  approach  considers  nominal  ex- 
change rate volatility  as a correlate of deviations  from the "law  of one 
price"  in goods markets. Using alternative methodologies,  some recent 
studies present evidence  that nominal volatility  contributes to interna- 
tional market segmentation.37 
It  is  sometimes  argued  that the  elimination  of  this  segmentation 
within EMU would have ambiguous effects  on the national welfares of 
member countries.  The benefits  from international trade creation,  the 
reasoning goes,  may be offset by a simultaneous diversion of trade from 
extra-EMU trading partners. The implicit analogy to the trade creating 
and diverting effects  of customs unions is wrong,  however.  A customs 
union's effect  on trade results from tariff changes that lower the private 
costs  of intra-union trade by more than the social  costs.  In contrast,  a 
rise  in intra-EMU trade due to lower  exchange  volatility  is  akin to a 
rise due to lower transport costs.  Because  social and private trade costs 
fall equally  in that case,  trade expansion  is beneficial  for EMU coun- 
tries.  Only  if EMU  causes  a big  rise in dollar-euro and yen-euro  ex- 
change rate volatility  is there a chance of its trade effects  being harmful 
35.  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990, pp. 66-68.) 
36.  For a discussion, see Obstfeld  (1995, pp. 141-44). 
37.  See, for example, Engel and Rogers (1995) and Obstfeld  and  Taylor (1997). Maurice Obsifeld  271 
to  the  euro  area.  But  it  is  not  obvious  that EMU  will  substantially 
change the euro zone's  external exchange  volatility. 
Probably the most significant gains from the single  currency regime 
stem  from its  effects  on  the political  equilibrium  that generates  out- 
comes  for trade,  monetary policy,  and fiscal  policy.  Several  authors 
(notably,  Barry Eichengreen)  argue that adjustable intra-EU exchange 
rates would weaken the single market as swings in competitiveness  lead 
to calls for protection.38 Certainly, the link between currency misalign- 
ment and protection has been one of the worst features of floating dollar 
exchange rates, although the misalignments have been bigger than those 
between EU countries and the European Commission  has much sharper 
teeth with  which  to enforce  trade rules in its bailiwick  than does  the 
World Trade Organization. It is quite plausible,  however,  that exchange 
volatility  would slow  or even reverse deeper market integration within 
Europe. 
The most  striking contribution of  the monetary unification process 
to economic  efficiency  is,  perhaps, to have forced inflation into remis- 
sion in a large number of European countries that seemed locked  in its 
grip at the start of the  1980s.  The allocational  costs  of high inflation, 
while  not adequately captured in existing  economic  theory,  are akin to 
those of exchange rate volatility but worse,  in that they affect the entire 
economy directly,  including sectors largely sheltered from international 
trade.  Furthermore,  divergent  inflation  rates invariably  heighten  ex- 
change rate volatility,  real as well  as nominal. 
Hoping to gain admission to the single  European currency that they 
were confident  would  someday  arrive, France, Italy,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Ireland, and others have brought inflation down to German levels  and 
below  (as shown above in figures 5 through 7).  Possibly,  some of these 
countries would have accomplished this feat without the prospect of EMU, 
as argued by  Susan Collins,  but the road would have been longer and 
harder.39  The drive toward EMU has fundamentally changed domestic 
political equilibria, strengthening the hands of central banks and of those 
elements  (primarily, but not exclusively,  in the business  community) 
favoring  greater integration  into  Europe and domestic  economic  and 
institutional reform. If the new European central bank can keep inflation 
in check,  the single  currency will  enhance and cement these gains. 
38.  Eichengreen  (1993,  p.  1329). 
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Despite  its similar design,  the ECB will not be the Bundesbank,  and 
it is difficult to predict how the new central bank's approach to monetary 
policy  will  evolve.  Currently,  there  is  open  disagreement  between 
France and Germany on the independence  of  the ECB from political 
influence.  France favors an institutional channel for political oversight, 
much to German dismay.  There is  also  confusion  about the compati- 
bility  of  ECB  independence  with  the  Maastricht treaty's  division  of 
responsibility  for exchange  rate policy between the ECB and the Coun- 
cil  of  Ministers.40 Under  a  September  1997  decision  by  the  Ecofin 
Council,  political  interventions on exchange  rates are envisioned  to be 
exceptional  rather than regular events.  How such issues  are resolvd  in 
practice remains to be seen. 
Loss of the Exchange Rate and Monetary Autonomy 
Once  Stage  Three  commences,  monetary policy  decisions  for the 
union will  be made by the Governing  Council  of the ECB.  The Gov- 
erning  Council  will  consist  of  the  governors  of  the  member  central 
banks and the ECB Executive  Board (comprising the president, the vice 
president,  and up to  four other members  appointed  unanimously  by 
EMU heads of state or government on the Ecofin Council's  recommen- 
dation).  Decisions  on monetary policy will be made by simple majority 
vote,  with the president's  vote determining ties.  As a practical matter, 
the national central banks will become regional branches of the ESCB, 
retaining  autonomy  only  insofar  as their actions  do not conflict  with 
ECB objectives.4' 
The EMU-wide  scope of monetary and exchange  rate policy poses  a 
potential  problem  for individual  member states,  as noted above.  If a 
country  suffers  an economic  downturn while  growth  remains  strong 
elsewhere,  its  currency cannot depreciate  to lower  its relative  prices 
and  spur demand,  nor can  it  devalue.  It shares  a currency  with  its 
40.  For discussion see Kenen  (1995, pp. 31-32). 
41.  Large interbank  transfers  of euro within EMU will be handled by the new 
TARGET  (trans-European  automated  real-time  gross settlement  express transfer)  pay- 
ments  system, which will link preexisting  national  systems. The preferred  mode  of open 
market  operation  will be tender  offers open to all eligible counterparties  in any EMU 
country. The ESCB's portfolio may (and will) include EMU government  obligations; 
the ESCB is prohibited  only from direct financing  of government  deficits. For details, 
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partners, and local economic  problems that do not simultaneously afflict 
most of them are unlikely  to affect  the foreign  exchange  value of the 
common  currency.  Because  monetary  policy  will  be  geared  toward 
price stability in the union as a whole,  the ECB will not lower interest 
rates in response to purely nation-specific  demand or supply shocks.  If 
the local  downturn is  persistent,  the country will  suffer  a protracted 
bout of  unemployment  above  the EMU average.  The high unemploy- 
ment will  persist  while  the national price level  falls,  and the limited 
scope  for labor to migrate to other euro-zone  countries  will  lengthen 
the adjustment process. 
How  costly  it  will  be  to  adjust within  EMU  without  the  nominal 
exchange  rate depends  on  the size  and incidence  of  asymmetric  real 
shocks,  as well  as on the efficacy  of the alternative adjustment mech- 
anisms.  Empirical research on the nature of European economic  shocks 
has failed to unearth any universally  accepted truths. Besides,  there is 
no guarantee that the future will  look  like  the past,  especially  as the 
past data were generated under policy  regimes quite different from the 
single  currency.  Considerable  attention has focused  on the possibility 
that the single  market will  promote regional economic  specialization, 
making the geographical  distribution of Europe's industries less diver- 
sified.42 In that case,  as Peter Kenen points out, Europe might become 
more susceptible to asymmetric real shocks and thus even less plausible 
as  an optimum  currency  area.43 The  likelihood  of  such  an outcome 
is  questionable,  particularly  as  service  industries,  many  accessible 
through cyberspace,  continue  to crowd out traditional manufacturing 
employment.44  And  the  single  currency  itself,  by  promoting  deeper 
integration among its users, would raise the potential costs of exchange 
rate volatility.  Nonetheless,  some asymmetric shocks clearly are in the 
cards: sterling fluctuations will affect Ireland disproportionately, move- 
ments  of  Sweden's  krona will  buffet  Finland,  and Germany may be 
especially  vulnerable to the continuing evolution  of industry in eastern 
Europe and the likely  enlargement  of the EU early in the twenty-first 
century.  The  current dispersion  of  growth  rates  in  the  EU  likewise 
42.  Krugman  (1993). 
43.  Kenen  (1969). 
44.  Frankel  and Rose (1996) argue  that, empirically,  more  extensive trade  between 
countries  raises the correlation  between  their  national  incomes. They interpret  this find- 
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testifies  to  the  difficulties  that common  exchange  and  interest  rates 
might cause. 
If asymmetric real shocks  remain likely,  the strength of adjustment 
mechanisms other than the exchange rate gives  little cause for comfort. 
Rigidities  in European output and labor markets mean that prices  and 
wages  move  very  slowly  to  eliminate  unemployment.  For example, 
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Pierre Alain Muet illustrate the slow  pace 
of  aggregate  price-level  adjustment in France since  the early  1980s, 
while  Giovanni  Peri and I show  that regional  price-level  reactions  in 
Germany and Italy do little to speed the adjustment to regional employ- 
ment  shocks.45 It is  sometimes  argued that EMU  will  promote  wage 
and price flexibility  by removing  the possibility  of an accommodative 
currency realignment,  but if that hypothesis  were true, one would ex- 
pect  to  see  much greater wage-price  flexibility  within  Germany than 
there appears to be.  Industry-level  wage bargaining-which  currently 
prevails  at the national but not at the European level-could  explain 
this  result.  However,  there is  little  in the experience  of  the EMS  to 
suggest  that even  longstanding  pegs  have  had much direct effect  on 
wage  and price flexibility.46 
Labor mobility  is probably an even  weaker aid to adjustment. It is 
extremely  limited  between  European countries,  and also  within many 
of  them.  Figure  12 illustrates  the  dispersion  in unemployment  rates 
among western German Ldnder (states).  Not only the increasing extent 
of this dispersion is striking, so is its persistence over time. This pattern 
is in sharp contrast to that in the United  States,  where labor mobility 
ensures that regional unemployment  rates show little persistence.47 
Indeed,  the plight  of  the currency unions that will join  to make up 
EMU leaves  little hope that powerful  adjustment mechanisms  will  op- 
erate  swiftly  to  eliminate  national  unemployment  problems  in EMU 
member countries.  Price and wage flexibility  are low,  and interregional 
45.  Blanchard  and Muet (1993); Obstfeld  and Peri (1997). 
46.  Hochreiter  and Winckler (1995) argue that Austria's policy of fixing to the 
deutsche  mark  has enhanced  real wage flexibility, giving that  country  one of the lowest 
unemployment  rates in the EU. It is unclear, however, whether  the credibility  of ex- 
change rate policy made wages flexible, or the high degree of corporatism  in Austria 
made  the exchange  rate  policy credible.  Whatever  the lessons of the Austrian  experience, 
it is doubtful  that they are fully applicable  to larger  potential  EMU entrants,  such as 
France,  Germany,  Italy, or Spain. 
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Figure 12.  German  Regional  Unemployment  Rates,  1977 versus  1990a 
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Source:  Obstfeld  and Peri (1997). 
a. Each dot represents  one of eleven western  German  Ldnder  (states). 
migration is very limited.  In fact,  the principal mechanism of regional 
stabilization  operating within these  countries  simultaneously  discour- 
ages adjustment and makes nonadjustment tolerable.  Regions  suffering 
high unemployment receive fairly open-ended inflows of fiscal transfers 
from central authorities or from other localities,  which support unem- 
ployed  workers while keeping them in place for longer periods.  Thus a 
fiscal system favoring  "regional  cohesion"  interacts with a rigid labor 
market to discourage  mobility.  The ongoing  economic  crisis in eastern 
Germany illustrates this mechanism  at work. 
The other major structural impediment to mobility  is the continuing 
distortion of housing markets, including government allocation of rental 
units,  high  transaction costs,  and widespread  regulation  of  mortgage 
markets. Government allocation,  for example,  typically  entails queues 
for apartments, and job-seekers  who arrive from other localities  go to 
the back of the line.  Gordon Hughes and Barry McCormick document 
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aggregate unemployment.  Duncan  Maclennan  notes  that in the Neth- 
erlands,  40  percent  of  rental units  are allocated  by  local  authorities 
rather than the  market.  And  Andrew  Oswald  presents  evidence  of  a 
negative relationship between overall national unemployment rates and 
stocks of private rental housing  in OECD countries.48 
Unless  EMU,  in itself,  forces them to rethink and reshape the entire 
spectrum of  social  policies,  countries  will  adopt the  single  currency 
without having even begun to solve their internal adjustment problems. 
The  sacrifice  entailed  by  an irrevocably  fixed  exchange  rate will  be 
greater as a result.  In Europe it is sometimes  argued that the discipline 
of  a single  currency  will  necessarily  force  participating  countries  to 
scale  down the edifice  of  market regulations  and social  benefits  asso- 
ciated  with the welfare  state.  In a few  EU countries  there have  been 
moves  in that direction,  but in many others, including France and Ger- 
many,  domestic  opposition  runs high and hardly any reforms of  sub- 
stance have been made. 
Some  analysts  of EMU's  prospects  see  in certain labor market rig- 
idities an argumentfor  a single currency. Suppose real wages are rigid, 
so  that  nominal  exchange  rate changes  feed  through  strongly  and 
quickly  to  nominal  wages.  In  that case,  the  exchange  rate may  be 
relatively  ineffective  as an adjustment device,  and countries lose  little 
by giving  it up. The scope for successful  currency realignment rests on 
the structural process of wage determination, an area where economists' 
knowledge  is incomplete.  I return to this topic in the next section. 
Fiscal  Policy  in EMU 
Both through statute and through its effects on economic  integration, 
EMU will  lessen  the scope  for individual  countries to carry out coun- 
tercyclical  stabilization  policy.  A country that starts from a position of 
public  deficit  will  find even  its  automatic  fiscal  stabilizers  compro- 
mised-probably  a more important loss,  in view  of the difficulties  in 
promptly implementing discretionary countercyclical  fiscal policy.  The 
loss of fiscal policy  as a stabilization tool potentially increases the costs 
of EMU in terms of macroeconomic  stability,  since the single currency 
would already have removed the option of changing the exchange  rate 
in the event of a country-specific  downturn. Furthermore, EMU could 
48.  Hughes  and McCormick  (1987); Maclennan  (1996); Oswald  (1996). Maurice Obsifeld  277 
put countries in the position  of having to cut budgets in circumstances 
of recession  and rising unemployment.  In this case,  EMU would not be 
neutral with respect to fiscal policy,  but destabilizing. 
Yet any tendency  for domestic  economic  or political  distortions  to 
generate excessive  deficits  and debt might be curbed by EMU's  fiscal 
constraints,  to the advantage of its members.49 Several studies suggest 
that the threat of exclusion  from the single currency can alter the high- 
deficit  equilibria  that have  long  plagued  many  countries  (shown  in 
figures 8 and 9).50  I argue below  that the durability of  any increased 
fiscal discipline  seen so far is questionable,  more so -than in the case of 
inflation. To impose ongoing  fiscal discipline,  however,  EMU provides 
for continuing  fiscal policy  coordination after the start of Stage Three. 
The Maastricht treaty outlines  an "excessive  deficits procedure"  to 
be directed against any "gross  errors" in fiscal policy  by EU member 
states.5'  The  Ecofin  Council,  acting  on  the  advice  of  the  European 
Commission,  may rule that a deficit is excessive  if it exceeds  3 percent 
of GDP or if government debt exceeds  60 percent. As noted above,  the 
fiscal  criterion for proceeding  to Stage Three is that a country not be 
found to have  an excessive  deficit  (a judgment  subject to nuances of 
speed  and direction  of  change  mentioned  above).  In Stage  Two  an 
excessive  deficit  carries no meaningful  penalties  other than the threat 
of exclusion  from Stage Three. 
In Stage Three, however,  a two-thirds weighted majority vote allows 
the Ecofin Council  to impose  penalties  on an offender,  including non- 
interest-bearing deposits  and fines. In response to German demands for 
quick and sure punishment of fiscal misbehavior within EMU, the Dub- 
lin European Council  in December  1996  went further in defining  the 
procedure that would  trigger such fines and the size  of the fines.  The 
49.  There are a number  of reasons for believing that domestic political processes 
produce  deficits higher  than  those that a unitary  social planner  would pick; see Alesina 
and  Perotti  (1  995b) for a survey. But  politics are  not  the only source  of excessive deficits. 
Just as governments  may be tempted  to reduce unemployment  by surprise  inflation- 
with the rational  expectations  equilibrium  result of high inflation  but no reduction  in 
average  unemployment-excessive fiscal  ease can be the equilibrium  of a game  between 
policymakers  and wage- and price-setters.  The fiscal coordination  failure  may be wors- 
ened if policymakers  are deprived of monetary  discretion;  see Agell, Calmfors, and 
Jonsson  (1996). 
50.  See Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993), McKinnon  (1997), and Rotte and 
Zimmermann  (1997). 
51.  Council  of the European  Communities  (1992, article 104c). 278  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
result was the "Stability  and Growth Pact, " finalized by the Amsterdam 
European Council  in June  1997.  At the Dublin  meeting,  France had 
managed to add the phrase "and growth"  to Germany's  favored title 
and, more important, to soften  its proposed terms.  Subsequently,  the 
new French Socialist  government left for the Amsterdam summit vow- 
ing to renegotiate the stability pact, but returned empty-handed.  All of 
these  developments  leave  considerable  uncertainty about how the sta- 
bility  pact will  work in practice.  One reason why many Germans fear 
a loose  interpretation of the fiscal entry criterion for EMU is the pos- 
sibility of setting a precedent that will weaken the exercise  of sanctions 
under the stability pact. 
Must members of a monetary union be saddled with fiscal restraints 
to ensure its smooth operation? In principle,  the answer clearly is no.52 
Private  capital  markets  might  discipline  government  borrowers  by 
means of steeply  rising borrowing rates. Deeper economic  integration 
could force fiscal harmonization along so many dimensions  that widely 
divergent  debt ratios would  be impracticable.  In addition,  the loss  of 
the ability to monetize  debt promotes a tighter budget constraint. These 
mechanisms,  which  operate powerfully  within longstanding  monetary 
unions such as the United States,  are already present in the EU, but so 
far have not imposed  anything resembling  tight limits  on government 
debts.  This situation may change after the single  currency arrives, but 
not quickly.  For the near future, the greater fiscal resources of national 
governments  compared with U.S.  states, for example,  will continue to 
give  the former a much longer rope.  Proponents of explicit  fiscal  re- 
straints contend that the rope is too long. 
The internal costs  of high deficits provide one motive for the exces- 
sive  deficits  procedure, but more important in shaping the treaty were 
concerns  about external effects  on other EMU members. Of these,  the 
fear that high debts might compromise the ESCB's  commitment to low 
inflation  heads  the  list.  Heavily  indebted  countries  might  lobby  for 
surprise  inflation  to  reduce  their  real  debts.  More  realistically,  the 
ESCB,  in  safeguarding  the  payments  system,  could  effectively  find 
itself  obliged  to bail out a country in financial distress by monetizing 
its liabilities.  Partly for this reason, and partly also to address the moral 
52.  Cooper  (1984) argues  this case in proposing  a single currency  for the industrial 
democracies,  managed  by a joint central  bank  of issue. Maurice  Obsifeld  279 
hazard problem associated with expected bailouts,  the ESCB is prohib- 
ited from directly buying government debt. The relevant provisions  of 
the Maastricht treaty could readily be circumvented, however,  so deficit 
and debt limits remain a potentially effective  (if not optimally designed) 
defense against central bank bailouts.  But the precise numerical limits 
specified in the Maastricht treaty have no persuasive rationale. 
The Maastricht treaty also  reflects  a fear of  bailouts  accomplished 
by conventional  fiscal transfers. Article  104b thus forbids the EU from 
bailing  out member states  by  assuming  their liabilities,  and likewise 
forbids individual  member states from bailing  each other out.  On the 
other  side,  Jiirgen von  Hagen  and Eichengreen  argue that centrally 
imposed fiscal constraints on subnational governments  tend to charac- 
terize  federations  in which  the center controls  most  tax collection.53 
When the states in the federation have significant powers to raise taxes 
on their own,  as would  be true in EMU,  borrowing restraints are less 
necessary because a state in fiscal difficulty can raise local taxes instead 
of pressing the center for a bailout.  Von Hagen and Eichengreen  con- 
clude that the quantitive restrictions of EMU are ill conceived.54 
Other potential coordination failures in EMU could be mitigated by 
fiscal  constraints,  however.  For example,  in  a floating  rate system, 
countries might be deterred from fiscal expansion by the fear of appre- 
ciating  their currencies  and squeezing  the tradables sector.  Thus the 
lack  of  cooperative  exchange  rate policy  could  actually  alleviate  the 
domestic  distortion of an excessive  deficit.55 With monetary union, the 
brake of a nominal appreciation is gone,  and the excessive  deficit prob- 
lem  therefore  grows  worse.  In such  cases,  the gains  from monetary 
union can be enhanced by appropriate fiscal limits. 
Another argument for curbing national fiscal  discretion  in EMU is 
53.  Von Hagen and Eichengreen  (1996); see also Glick and Hutchison  (1993). The 
borrowing  restrictions  present in forty-nine U.S.  states (all but Vermont) are self- 
imposed, not mandated  by Washington. 
54.  For surveys of fiscal policy in EMU, see Bovenberg, Kremers, and Masson 
(1991), Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini  (1993), and Kenen (1995, chap. 4). The bailout 
problem  does appear  to be relevant  empirically, based on the experience of existing 
European  currency  unions. In 1994, the German  Constitutional  Court  allowed  the federal 
government  to start making special bailout payments  to Saarland  and Bremen, whose 
debt levels had reached  "alarming  proportions";  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1997, p. 25). 
55.  See Rogoff (1985). Rogoff's example was based on government  fears of cur- 
rency  depreciation, so the argument  in the text would apply to a world in which fiscal 
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that fiscal  policy  in  itself  can  be  a  source  of  idiosyncratic  national 
shocks.  The  Johnson  administration's  fiscal  expansion  in  the  1960s 
helped  to bring down  the Bretton Woods  system.  The deficits  caused 
by German reunification  helped  to shatter the EMS in  1992-93.  And 
had Europe been pegging  to the dollar in the 1980s,  the Reagan admin- 
istration's  fiscal  expansion  would  have  affected  European countries 
much as did the German expansion  under Chancellor Kohl. 
Fiscal  constraints  might  also  have  the beneficial  effect  of  forcing 
countries to scale back overgenerous social benefit programs. As argued 
above,  these programs often  impede labor market adjustment over the 
longer  run,  and  they  reduce  wage  flexibility  by  discouraging  com- 
petition  for  jobs.  A  related  phenomenon  is  state-subsidized  hidden 
unemployment  in the form of early retirement, as suggested by remark- 
ably  low  labor force  participation  rates for older  men  in most  high- 
unemployment  countries  of  continental  Europe.56 A  stricter  fiscal 
environment could conceivably  contribute to greater labor market flex- 
ibility  if accompanied  by other measures to increase geographical  and 
occupational mobility,  such as housing market reform. Greater mobility 
would,  in  turn,  make  the  single  currency  easier  to  live  with.  How 
powerfully  these  mechanisms  might  work is  anyone's  guess.  So  far, 
most EU countries have made only minimal progress in this direction. 
At least since  the time of the influential MacDougall  Report, Euro- 
pean planners have been concerned  that the feasible  size  of the Com- 
munity budget leaves insufficient scope for the kind of fiscal federalism 
practiced in the United  States and other currency unions as a cushion 
to  idiosyncratic  regional  shocks.57 The  scale  of  fiscal  federalism  ac- 
tually  seems  larger  within  European  countries  than  in the  United 
States.58 But there is little chance that EMU members will  agree on a 
system  of stabilizing  intercountry transfers in the near future.59 
56.  In 1993,  participation rates for men aged fifty-five  through sixty-four  were 34.1 
percent  in Belgium,  44.0  percent in Finland,  43.5  percent in France,  51.5  percent  in 
Germany,  32.9  percent in Italy,  38.4  percent in Luxembourg,  and 41.5  percent in the 
Netherlands.  By  contrast,  the equivalent  rates were 65.5  percent in the United  States, 
64.3  percent  in the  United  Kingdom,  61.0  percent in Canada,  85.4  percent in Japan, 
and 84.4  percent  in Switzerland.  These  numbers obviously  do  not cover  work in the 
underground economy.  (OECD Employment Outlook, July  1995,  p. 206.) 
57.  Commission  of the European Communities  (1977). 
58.  See  Pisani-Ferry,  Italianer,  and Lescure  (1993)  for  simulation  evidence  on 
France, Germany,  and the United States. 
59.  Von Hagen and Eichengreen  (1996)  predict that as a result of EMU fiscal restic- Maurice  Obstfeld  281 
As noted above,  the excessive  deficits  procedure and stability  pact 
will  reduce the scope  for automatic fiscal stabilizers to serve as a sub- 
stitute cushion  at the national level,  in particular, for highly  indebted 
Coulntries. This is a non-negligible  cost of EMU.  However,  automatic 
tisca.l stabilizers  are not a perfect substitute for currency realignment. 
Fiscal stabilizers are useful  in the face of transitory shocks but less  so 
in countering persistent changes,  because  a permanently higher fiscal 
dleficit impedes necessary  price adjustment and may violate  a govern- 
mllenft's  long-run solvency.  Yet  it is precisely  in the case  of  persistent 
slhocks that currency realignment  can be most useful.  In any event,  if 
F,MU really  does  promote  deeper  market integration,  as  its  backers 
conitend, the domestic  stabilizing  powers of national fiscal policy  will 
wane as economies  become  more open.60 On all of these grounds, the 
truLe  stabilization  costs  of  the  Maastricht  fiscal  constraints  are quite 
ulnlcertain. 
Any  offsetting  long-run economic  benefits of  the fiscal  constraints 
will  require painful sacrifices  by the public in the first years of  Stage 
Three.  Will political  support for the single  currency erode as a result? 
An optimist might hope that the pain of moving to the new fiscal regime 
hais been frontloaded into the EMU selection  process.  If the countries 
thait  pass this year's test have achieved  sustainable consolidation,  they 
may be able to abide by the stability pact without severe  strain. 
However,  recent research on earlier fiscal consolidations  shows that 
this scenario is very possibly  unrealistic.  In a study of OECD countries 
atetr 1960,  Alberto Alesina  and Roberto Perotti find that fiscal consol- 
idations  based  on  cuts  in government  wage  bills  tend to be durable; 
those  based  on  tax  increases  or  cuts  in  government  capital  outlays 
typically  are reversed.  Robert Inman finds similar results for American 
states ." 
Alesina  and Perotti's  empirical  model  would  predict that much of 
tions, member  states will press the European  Union to develop substitute  intercountry 
transfer  arrangements;  see also Obstfeld and Peri (1997). Some members, however, 
currently  oppose creation  of a "transfer  union." 
60.  For discussions, see Cooper  (1990), Eichengreen  (1990), Goodhart  and Smith 
(1993), and Krugman  (1993). 
61.  Alesina and Perotti  (1995a); Inman  (1996). For additional  evidence from indus- 
trial  countries, see McDermott  and Wescott (1996). Adjustment  through  tax increases 
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the fiscal consolidation  that has taken place in preparation for EMU is 
not durable. Table 3 summarizes patterns of fiscal adjustment between 
1991 and 1997 for ten possible  EMU members (1997  figures are OECD 
forecasts).  Roughly  speaking,  the countries fall into three groups. The 
first comprises  Austria,  France,  and Germany.  These  have  generally 
been moderate deficit countries,  but rising public debt and unemploy- 
ment  over  the  1990s  would  have  left  them  wide  of  the  Maastricht 
reference deficit  in  1997,  had they not taken corrective  measures.  To 
offset  increases  in  social  benefits  and  interest  payments,  they  have 
mainly raised taxes and cut capital outlays.62 Of these three countries, 
only  Germany has made an effort to cut the politically  sensitive  gov- 
ernment wage bill.  In France, that item actually increased by 1 percent 
of  GDP,  and the  Jospin  government  is  proposing  to  expand  public 
employment.  The Alesina-Perotti  findings thus would lead one to ques- 
tion the sustainability  of current fiscal adjustments in this group. 
Finland, Ireland, and the Netherlands form a second group, countries 
where adjustment looks more durable. Finland, facing problems similar 
to those  of  France (but more severe),  has reduced both categories  of 
government  consumption,  although  simultaneously  taxes  have  been 
raised and capital outlays cut. Ireland accomplished  a successful  fiscal 
turnaround at the end of the 1980s.  In the 1990s it has cut government 
consumption  and taxes  and has been rewarded by lower  interest rates 
on its still sizable public debt. The Netherlands has lowered government 
consumption  and taxes.  With the help of  labor market reforms,  it has 
also been able to slash social  spending and subsidies  (by 3.5 percent of 
GDP).  Not surprisingly,  these three countries, along with Luxembourg, 
are the only  potential  first-round EMU entrants that are not currently 
subject to an excessive  deficit finding by the Ecofin Council. 
Belgium,  Italy,  Portugal,  and Spain  make  up the  third group,  as 
countries of generally  high structural deficits.  For these,  the durability 
of  adjustments  will  be  especially  important for  life  under the  EMU 
stability  pact.  Belgium's  deficit  reduction  comes  from  a sizable  tax 
increase  coupled  with  smaller cuts  in social  benefits  and government 
nonwage  consumption.  Government  wage  payments  actually  have 
risen,  but public  finances  have  benefited  from  falling  interest  rates. 
62.  Austria's underlying fiscal situation deteriorated  by much less than those of 
France  and Germany  during 1991-97. r-  rq  00  t 
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Italy has so far benefited  less  from lower  interest rates, but it has cut 
wage consumption by a percent of GDP. The bulk of its deficit reduction 
comes,  however,  from lower capital outlays and much higher tax rev- 
enues.  In Portugal, government wages  and social  spending have risen. 
The large deficit reduction shown in table 3 is due to sharply increased 
tax revenues  and a big cut in the interest bill  as inflation has dropped 
from  over  12 percent  per year  in  1991  to  a forecast  2.4  percent for 
1997.63  In Spain, a cut in capital outlays has been the main force driving 
the fiscal deficit down. None of these four countries' efforts comfortably 
meets the Alesina-Perotti  prescription for durability. 
Italy's  present  situation  might  pose  an exception  to  the  Alesina- 
Perotti regularity, due to the special  favorable conditions  that it would 
face on entering EMU in 1999.  Its real interest rates would fall relative 
to current levels,  reducing the cost of public debt service  dramatically 
and possibly  producing a balanced government  budget.  But a tempo- 
rarily balanced budget need not imply sustainable fiscal consolidation. 
Fiscal  relaxation  might  well  follow,  and government  finances  would 
remain exposed  to sudden runups in EMU interest rates. 
The much publicized  one-off  maneuvers that countries have used to 
squeeze  under the  Maastricht  treaty's  3  percent  limit  underline  the 
impression that much of the recent fiscal progress  is temporary,  if not 
illusory.  Countries that have failed  to invest  in sustainable budgetary 
consolidation  may find it hard to live within EMU's fiscal confines after 
1999. As they have quarreled over interpretation of the Maastricht entry 
criteria and ECB oversight,  EMU members will quarrel over the imple- 
mentation of the stability  pact. The much needed process  of  long-run 
fiscal reform, only starting in many countries, will be slow.  Any serious 
public budget cuts that result, however much they may be justified,  will 
focus  public resentment on the single  currency regime. 
In Search of the Counterfactual 
An important question  in the cost-benefit  analysis  of the move  to a 
single  European currency is the counterfactual: what type of economic 
policy  regime  would  emerge  in Europe were  the  single  currency re- 
moved  from the agenda? Despite  its potential  problems,  EMU  looks 
63.  But this implies that the fall in Portugal's  real (inflation-adjusted)  government 
deficit is much smaller  than  the 3.8 percent  of GDP shown in table 3. Maurice ObsMfeld  285 
better than some  conceivable  regimes,  though  possibly  worse  than 
others. 
Were EMU to be delayed  indefinitely,  the EU would try to retain a 
band exchange  rate mechanism of some sort, for both good reasons (to 
lower  protectionist  pressures  on  the  single  market) and bad (to  ease 
administration of agricultural protection).  In recent years, the momen- 
tum toward the single  currency has allowed  the ERM to combine  wide 
official  currency bands with  a high degree  of  exchange  stability.  But 
with policy convergence  more haphazard and market expectations more 
diffuse,  a broad-band ERM lacking  the endpoint of  a single  currency 
would  force  a choice  between  more volatile  exchange  rates and nar- 
rower currency bands,  such as those in force up to August  1993. 
A  floating  rate regime  based  on  a small  number of  sub-European 
currency blocs  could  work tolerably  well,  but would  not produce the 
deeper market integration that a common currency could bring. From a 
purely economic  viewpoint,  the comparison  of this arrangement with 
the single  currency regime is that described by Mundell (subject to the 
special  monetary and fiscal features of EMU).64 
The  prospect  of  a renewed  ERM leads  to  a different  calculus.  In 
principle,  such a system could eliminate the worst drawbacks that Rich- 
ard Cooper,  for example,  attributes to volatile  exchange  rates.65 The 
difficulty  with this counterfactual is that fixed rates are extremely  vul- 
nerable to speculative  attack in the current setting of high international 
financial  integration.  Weak  macroeconomic  policy  coordination  and 
looser fiscal discipline  would take Europe back to the conditions  of the 
"early  EMS"  (roughly,  1979-87),  when capital controls were needed 
to support fixed exchange  rates.  Proliferating financial restrictions,  to 
the extent  these  were  effective,  would  undermine the  single  market. 
Expectations of exchange rate realignment would generate currency risk 
premiums absent under a single  currency, while creating adverse pres- 
sures  on  domestic  prices  and  wages.66  Poor  economic  performance 
would  create strong pressures for change; but if political  imperatives 
were to make this regime  the relevant alternative,  then EMU may be 
preferable. 
64.  Mundell (1961). 
65.  Cooper (1984). 
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The "Outs"  and EMU 
Those EU countries that do not join EMU at the start of Stage Three 
will  face  the choice  of joining  a revamped exchange  rate mechanism. 
ERM2 will  allow  countries desiring  admission  on a later date to meet 
the exchange  rate convergence  criterion by pegging  to the euro.  The 
concomitant  purpose  is to discourage  big shifts  in intra-EU competi- 
tiveness,  and the resulting outcry from the producers who are undercut. 
Membership in ERM2 is not compulsory. 
The rules of the new system foresee joint intervention by individual 
members  of  ERM2  and the  ECB  to  defend  relatively  wide  bilateral 
bands,  but it is explicitly  acknowledged  that intervention may be sus- 
pended if price stability  is threatened. In such cases,  central euro par- 
ities  will  be realigned.  This  explicit  escape  clause  will  make ERM2 
even  more fragile  than its predecessor.  In effect,  outsiders will  be on 
their own  in  a crisis,  with  the  option  to  realign  at either  their own 
initiative or that of the ECB. Participants could be subject to speculative 
attacks that periodically  dash their hopes  of entering EMU.67 Even  if 
they desire to join  EMU eventually,  the peripheral status of ERM2 in 
the EU policy  coordination  hierarchy may weaken outsiders'  commit- 
ment to its parities.  Because  the "outs"  can benefit from depreciating 
their currencies,  competing  producers within EMU will lobby for their 
early admission.  All  of these considerations  are likely  to make adher- 
ence  to ERM2 weaker than adherence to ERMI  has been.68 
Problems in running EMU naturally will make outsider EU countries 
cautious  about pegging  to the euro.  In that case,  the Anglo-Swedish 
model  of  domestic  inflation targeting might begin  to appear more at- 
tractive. It remains to be seen whether the "outs"  will suffer as a result 
of  their exclusion  from EMU,  or will  be net beneficiaries  because  of 
the policy  flexibility  that they retain. In the extreme case,  "ins"  might 
elect to become  "outs,"  by exiting the single currency. The Maastricht 
treaty makes provision  only for the expansion of the euro zone,  not for 
its  contraction.  A  seceder  would  therefore  incur diplomatic  costs  as 
well  as those of financial conversion.  But for the same reason that the 
67.  De Grauwe  (1997) discusses this possibility. 
68.  According  to a Franco-German  proposal,  a "euro forum," comprising  the eco- 
nomics and finance  ministers  of EMU countries  only, will convene shortly  before meet- 
ings of the Ecofin  Council. This institutional  innovation  is sure  to heighten  the outsiders' 
sense of disenfranchisement.  Sweden has protested  the plan. Maurice ObsMfeld  287 
EU  currently has  little  choice  but to  accept  Sweden's  preannounced 
refusal to join  EMU in  1999,  it will  have few  credible sanctions  with 
which to deter a country that is determined to abandon the euro. 
Real Rigidities and the Nominal Exchange Rate 
If wages  are totally  rigid in real terms and output market prices are 
flexible,  changes  in the nominal  exchange  rate cannot  affect  the real 
economy  by  shifting  relative  prices.  They  merely  lead to  immediate 
proportional changes  in all domestic  money prices.  Defenders  of EMU 
contend that Europe's real wage rigidities render the nominal exchange 
rate a rather ineffective,  and inflationary,  mode  of  adjustment.  The 
implication  is  that EMU  members give  up little  by way  of  attractive 
policy  options  when they irrevocably lock their exchange  rates. 
There are, however,  several considerations  that cut in favor of pre- 
serving  the  realignment  option  in economies  with  real  labor market 
rigidities.  First,  a rigid  economy  adjusts more slowly  to  asymmetric 
real shocks than does a flexible economy,  so that rigidities magnify the 
economic  costs of the shocks.  Second,  if there is even minimal nominal 
wage  rigidity  (which  certainly  is the case  in Europe),  it may still  be 
possible  to  eliminate  much of  the adjustment cost  following  a shock 
through a well-chosen  currency  realignment.  Finally,  nominal price 
rigidities  can make currency realignment an effective  stabilization  de- 
vice,  even  when  real wages  are very  rigid.  Despite  these  mitigating 
factors,  the power  of  real wage  rigidity  to  limit  the effectiveness  of 
realignment should not be dismissed  for the European economies.  The 
outcome  rests,  in  large  part,  on  the  precise  modes  by  which  price 
inflation passes  through to wages  in individual countries. 
Rigidities  and Real  Wage Adjustment 
The remarkable power  of  a nominal  exchange  rate realignment  to 
accommodate  a change  in international competitiveness  in a stroke is 
well  illustrated within  sticky-price  open  economy  models  based on a 
standard Phillips  curve for wage  adjustment.69 
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A simple  model  along  these  lines  assumes  a Phillips  curve for the 
(log)  nominal wage  w, 
(1)  w, =  w,  + 
E,tIpc 
-  pc  I 
+  (1  -  0)(pc  -  Etp)  -Ip 
where  pc  is  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI,  also  in  logs),  u  is  the 
unemployment  rate (in percent),  and E, denotes  an expectation  based 
on information  at date t.  In the model,  the base wage  is set ahead of 
time,  using date t-  1 information,  but can be adjusted on date t by a 
fraction  1 -  0 (between  zero  and one)  of  the CPI forecast  error. The 
wage indexation parameter, 0, captures the degree of nominal rigidity, 
where 0  =  1 is the case in which nominal wages  are not at all indexed 
to the current CPI.70 
With constant  markup and cost  of capital,  the log  domestic  output 
price  index,  p,  can be expressed  (omitting  a constant)  as a weighted 
average of wages  and the log import price index,  p', 
(2)  p  =  ,Bw +  (1  -  f3)p'. 
Thus the domestic  CPI is a weighted  average of the nominal wage and 
import prices, 
(3)  ~~~pC  =  (Xw +  (I  -  ,W,)pl. 
The model is closed  with an equation to determine unemployment, 
(4)  u=  8(p-  p)  +  E, 
where  E  is  a stochastic  disturbance.  Since  the model  depicts  a small 
economy  with a fixed exchange  rate, import prices are taken as given. 
They rise,  however,  when the home currency is devalued  against for- 
eign  currencies. 
Now  consider  a negative  employment  shock to the home economy, 
perhaps a fall  in foreign  demand,  which  I represent as an unexpected 
permanent rise in the shift factor, E, in equation 4. If the home country's 
exchange  rate is fixed within  a monetary union,  and the shock affects 
all  union  members  symmetrically,  the exchange  rate of  the common 
currency will fall to cushion employment.  If, instead, the shock affects 
the home country asymmetrically,  its economy  will  suffer a period of 
70.  Bruno and Sachs (1985) utilize essentially this formulation.  Variables  are de- 
viations from trends. Maurice Obstfeld  289 
high unemployment  and deflation.  In the present model,  the long-run 
natural rate of unemployment  is zero (apart from a constant),  as equa- 
tion  1 shows.  According  to equation 4,  domestic  prices will thus have 
to fall,  driven by falling wages,  until increased home competitiveness, 
p  -  p, just offsets  the rise dE in the level  of E.  The long-run nominal 
and real wage effects  are 
dw  =-  dw-dpc=  (1-  )dE 
The parameter -y, which measures the sensitivity  of the expected real 
wage  to  unemployment,  is  one  index  of  the  flexibility  of  the  labor 
market. When -y is relatively  small,  unemployment  must remain high 
for a long time to bring about the declines  in nominal and real wages 
described  above.  The  first lesson  from this  standard model  (one  that 
generalizes  well beyond it) is that the unemployment cost of a negative 
shock is higher when the labor market is less  flexible. 
Consider  next unanticipated currency devaluation  as a response  to 
the shock. Devaluation raises p' permanently. A devaluation that results 
in the import price change 
dp  [1  -(1  -  0)]dE 
obviates  the need  for nominal  wages  to fall  and moves  the economy 
immediately  to its new stationary position  at the natural rate of unem- 
ployment,  with a higher price level and a permanently lower real wage. 
Importantly,  there are no further dynamics  after the immediate  price 
rise  caused  by  the  devaluation:  in equation  1 neither unemployment 
pressure nor the expectation  of further CPI change is working to move 
nominal wages.  A period of costly  recession  is therefore avoided.  In a 
nutshell,  this finding summarizes the case for exchange  rate flexibility 
with nationally asymmetric output market shocks.  But it must be qual- 
ified by three observations. 
First, devaluation cannot work if indexation is complete  (0  =  0); in 
that case,  all domestic  prices rise fully  in proportion to import prices, 
so nominal realignment  is powerless  to affect relative prices.  When 0 
is above  zero,  even  by a small  amount,  however,  devaluation  can be 
successful.  But  in  the  case  of  an  "epsilon"  of  nominal  rigidity,  a 
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immediately  rise nearly in proportion to import prices,  a consequential 
gap between  them requires a huge unexpected change in the exchange 
rate. 
Second,  the unemployment  shock  hurts the economy  even  when  a 
well-chosen  devaluation forestalls the incipient unemployment.  Instead 
of  unemployment,  the economy  experiences  permanent deterioration 
in the terms of  trade (which  is the same as a rise in competitiveness, 
p'  -  p).  This  alternative  is preferable,  because  it does  less  to widen 
income  inequality  and avoids  the social  and fiscal costs  of higher un- 
employment. 
Third, the behavioral assumptions underpinning the optimistic  view 
of  exchange  rate flexibility  deserve  scrutiny.  A  priori,  these  are not 
highly plausible.  Take the date t -  1 expectation  of the Phillips curve 
in equation  1 and write it as 
(5)  E,tI  Wt -  E,  lp5  =  I  -  pcI  -  yutI 
Equation  5  implies  that when  unemployment  is  at zero,  workers  are 
always content to accept their current real wage as their expected future 
real wage,  regardless of how the current real wage was determined. For 
example,  even  if the current real wage  is the ex post low  result of an 
unexpected devaluation,  workers will happily live with it, provided the 
labor market is  not tight.  This  specification  embodies  a very  strong 
assumption:  that organized  workers  will  not  resist  a decline  in  real 
wages.  Most research on European labor markets has concluded,  to the 
contrary, that real wage resistance  is a factor to be reckoned with.7' 
An alternative to the standard Phillips curve model of wages and the 
natural rate,  widely  applied  in  studies  of  Europe,  assumes  that the 
expected  real wage  is persistent and is driven gradually to its long-run 
level  by unemployment: 
E,_  w,  -E  lp,  =  p(W,tI  -  pC-)  -  (1  -  p)yutI 
In this formulation,  p may be viewed  as a measure of  "planned,"  or 
ex ante, real wage rigidity.  But this formulation still implies an absence 
of ex  post real wage  resistance,  since  it amounts to equation 5 with p 
set equal to one where that parameter first occurs. The main substantive 
difference  from the standard Phillips  curve  is that the natural rate of 
71.  Layard, Nickell,  and Jackman (1991,  pp. 2 10-1 1). Maurice Obstfeld  291 
unemployment  becomes  a function  of the real wage  and, through the 
real wage,  of  the terms of  trade.72 Nonetheless,  it is  illuminating  to 
build  on this  formulation  to  incorporate meaningful  real wage  resis- 
tance.  The last equation,  written to take account of CPI indexation,  is 
the same as 
(6)  Aw  =  E_  Apc  +  (1  -  0)(pc-  E,pC) 
-  (1  -  p)(Wt_I  -p,C  I  +  yu,t), 
where,  for  example,  Aw,  =w  -  w,.  Blanchard  and  Muet  use  a 
similar error correction specification in their study of France.73  Nominal 
wages  are set as in equation  1, except  that wage  dynamics  are driven 
by the absolute  level  of the real wage  as well  as by unemployment.  A 
high  value  of  p signifies  that the short-run imbalance  between  wages 
and unemployment  exerts  a weak  influence  in moderating real wage 
demands. 
"Error correction"  is a misnomer in this context,  however,  for under 
the  last  wage  equation,  workers  do  not build  past  inflation  forecast 
errors-which  unexpectedly  reduce ex  post real wages-into  current 
wage demands.  Instead,  they passively  accept the real wage effects  of 
their forecast  errors,  taking the current ex  post  wage  as the base  for 
their  current wage  bargain.74 Under  real  wage  resistance,  however, 
workers aspire to the ex ante real wage that they bargained previously, 
so that 
(7)  Aw  =E  Apc +  (1-  0)(p,c-E,tIpc)  -(1  -  p)(wt_ 
- 
pI 
+ 
-yut) 
+  p[pC  I-  -Et 
-  E,2  w,)] 
In this specification,  workers bargaining on date t regain a fraction p of 
their real wage  loss  due to incomplete  wage  indexation on date t -  1. 
Their  efforts  greatly  complicate  the  economy's  response  to  an  un- 
72.  For discussions,  see Bean (1994),  Phelps (1994),  and Blanchard  and Katz 
(1996). In the text's model, a higher  real wage is associated  with a lower natural  rate, 
for example, because unemployed workers spend less time in job search when the 
opportunity  cost of joblessness is higher. 
73.  Blanchard  and Muet (1993). 
74.  Thus equation 6 has the odd implication  that even when p  =  1, unexpected 
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Figure  13.  Simulating  Unemployment  Dynamics  after a Fall in Demanda 
Unemployment rate (percent) 
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Source:  Author's  calculations,  based on model described  in text. 
a. Simulation  measures  response to a I percent  fall in labor demand.  Simulation  involving devaluation  with no catch-up  takes 
equation  6 as its wage equation.  Simulation  allowing for catch-up  uses equation  7. See text for details. 
expected  devaluation,  as  the  literature  on  lagged  wage  indexation 
75  recognizes. 
Effects of Devaluation 
The potential pitfalls  of devaluation are illustrated in figures 13 and 
14,  which  show  the  economy's  response  to an unexpected  1 percent 
fall in labor demand under alternative exchange  rate policies  and wage 
setting  structures.76 With  no  policy  response,  unemployment  rises 
75.  See, for example, Fischer  (1988); although,  in a sense, the point  was raised  long 
ago in the present  context by McKinnon  (1963). The "levels" version  of equation  7 is 
w,  =  E,1pC  +  (1  -  0)(pc  -  E,-,pc)  +  p(E,-2w,1  -  E,I2p  )  -  (1  -  p)u,_. 
76.  The parameters  chosen for these exercises are p =  0.964; y =  2.44; 0 =  0.2, 
implying  80 percent  contemporaneous  wage indexation  to the CPI; ,3 =  0.8; +  =  0.65; 
and 8  =  0.2.  The first two parameters  are suggested  by Blanchard  and Muet's (1993) 
study  for France,  based  on quarterly  data, so the simulation  periods  should  be interpreted Maurice Obsifeld  293 
Figure  14.  Simulating  Price Level Dynamics  after a Fall in Demanda 
Log price level 
0.08  D evaluation, with catch-up 
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Source:  Author's  calculations,  based on model described  in text. 
a. Simulation measures  response to a I percent  fall in labor demand.  Simulation  involving devaluation  with no catch-up  takes 
equation  6 as its wage equation.  Simulation  allowing for catch-up  uses equation  7. See text for details. 
sharply and then decays  toward its  (higher)  long-run natural rate,  as 
consumer  prices  fall.  Nominal  wages  (not  shown)  fall  more quickly 
than the CPI, so real wages  decline  progressively  over time. 
If,  as wage  equation  6 implies,  there is no lagged  catch-up of real 
wages to previously  expected  levels,  an 8 percent currency devaluation 
puts the economy  roughly at its new stationary equilibrium (figure 13). 
A cost of the policy  is a one-off  price level  increase of about 6 percent, 
because wages  are extensively  indexed to the CPI. But the devaluation 
lowers real wages to their warranted level in a stroke, avoiding the long 
period of unemployment that would otherwise be needed to achieve the 
same reduction in real wages  through deflation. 
The  last  scenario  may be overly  optimistic,  however.  In the third 
as quarters.  Blanchard  and Muet do not impose on their estimated  wage equation  the 
parameter  restrictions  embodied in equation 7.  In addition, their model incorporates 
price-setting  behavior.  Their empirical  findings  concerning  devaluation  look quite dif- 
ferent  from the effects shown in figures 13 and 14, as discussed  below. 294  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
simulation shown in figure 13, wages are set by equation 7. Unemploy- 
ment falls in the initial period of devaluation,  but then rises sharply, as 
wages and prices rise further in the subsequent period. Since real wages 
are not as low  as in the  absence  of  a devaluation  (precisely  because 
unemployment  was low  for a period),  for the balance of the transition 
unemployment  slightly  exceeds  the level  of the nondevaluation  simu- 
lation.  Devaluation  thus produces only  a transitory employment  gain, 
at the cost of greater variability in the price level. 
Table 4 is a preliminary attempt to estimate equation 7 on annual EU 
data. (I add a labor productivity variable to the equation.)  Expectations 
of CPI inflation are proxied by a regression of that variable on its own 
lags,  lags of nominal wage  growth,  and lags of import price inflation. 
Because  expectations  are measured with error, twice-lagged  values of 
inflation, unemployment,  the real wage,  productivity,  and import-price 
inflation are used  as instrumental variables.  The current CPI forecast 
error is impounded in the equation disturbance. 
Clearly,  the success  of the specification  is limited.  While most var- 
iables  have the expected  sign,  in general they  are estimated  very im- 
precisely.  The "lagged  forecast error" variable which is a lagged CPI 
forecast error, and thus measures the lagged error in forecasting the real 
wage,  always  has a positive  sign but enters significantly  only  for the 
Netherlands.  Thus it is difficult to conclude much from these structural 
wage  equations. 
Econometric  models  based  on semistructural equations  or reduced 
forms suggest the presence of some lagged catch-up in real wages.77 Its 
strength, however,  produces devaluation effects  on unemployment  in- 
termediate to those  of the "no  catch-up"  and "with  catch-up"  cases 
shown  in figure 13. The experiences  of Britain, Finland, Italy,  Spain, 
and Sweden  after devaluing  in the early  1990s  are consistent  with  an 
absence of strong catch-up effects,  although labor market deregulation 
under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher makes Britain atypical of Eu- 
rope,  and Italy dismantled  its official  wage  indexation  system  (scala 
mobile)  shortly before the  1992 crisis. 
More research into the relation between the reduced-form equations 
in existing  macromodels  and the underlying structural model plainly is 
77.  See, for example, Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990), Blanchard 
and Muet (1993), and Baker, Fitz Gerald,  and Honohan  (1996). U  -  n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L 
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in  order.  The  reduced  forms  estimated  often  span  several  different 
policy  regimes  and their usefulness  for policy  evaluation  certainly  is 
subject  to  the  Lucas  critique.  Nonetheless,  the  totality  of  available 
evidence  suggests  that unexpected  devaluation  can be quite effective, 
even in the European context.  Any advantages that exchange  rate flex- 
ibility confers are all the more helpful because labor market inflexibility 
makes it so costly  to adjust to shocks  in other ways. 
Reinforcing  this conclusion  is the observation that prices as well  as 
wages  are somewhat  inflexible  in nominal terms,  so that devaluation 
may  affect  output and employment  even  when  real  wages  are quite 
rigid.  Olivier Jeanne employs  a closed  economy  model with monopo- 
listic producers and real wage rigidity to show that monetary expansion 
can have a persistent effect  on output, even when the extent of nominal 
price rigidity is small.78 The corollary for open economies  is that even 
when  real wage  rigidities  are pervasive,  a small  amount of  nominal 
price rigidity  might allow  exchange  rate changes  to play an important 
role. 
The End of the Beginning: Launching the Euro 
The ground rules governing  the introduction of the euro reduce the 
prospects  for quiet in the foreign  exchange  market after May  1998.79 
The  Maastricht treaty and subsequent  EU decisions  tightly  constrain 
the way in which conversion  rates between participating currencies and 
the euro are to be set in Stage Three. These  euro rates will  determine 
the relative real exchange  rates at which EMU is launched,  and affect 
government fiscal positions  and the distribution of wealth within EMU. 
Given how slowly  European economies  adjust to disequilibria, an initial 
mistake  on  real exchange  rates would  have  long-lived  consequences 
that could undermine support for the single  currency. 
Conversion  rates  of  EMU  member  currencies  into  the  euro-the 
prices of the euro in terms of member currencies-are  to be set unani- 
78.  Jeanne  (forthcoming). 
79.  Analyses of  the problem of  setting euro conversion rates include Gros and 
Lannoo  (1996), Begg and others (1997), De Grauwe  and Spaventa  (1997), Flood and 
Garber  (1997), and Kenen (1997). The present  discussion is based on Obstfeld  (forth- 
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mously  by  the Ecofin  Council  at the start of  Stage  Three.  However, 
article  1091(4) of  the  Maastricht treaty requires that the adoption  of 
conversion  rates between the euro and the currencies of the EMU mem- 
bers "shall by itself not modify the external value of the ECU [European 
Currency Unit]."80  The Madrid European Council  of December  1995 
decided  to change  the name of the single  currency from ECU to euro 
and decreed further: "In the case of contracts denominated by reference 
to the official  ECU basket of the European Community,  in accordance 
with the [Maastricht] Treaty, substitution by the Euro will be at the rate 
of one to one,  unless  otherwise  provided in the contract.""' 
These  stipulations  together imply that a euro will  be defined at the 
start of Stage Three to have the same value as an official  ECU basket 
at the end of  Stage Two; that is,  on December  31,  1998.  The official 
ECU basket will  cease  to exist  as of the start of Stage Three,  and the 
euro will  seamlessly  take its place. 
Another implication is that the value of the euro cannot be predicted 
in  advance  of  December  31,  1998,  as  the  ECU  basket  contains  the 
currencies of countries that will not join EMU in 1999 and are unlikely 
to  maintain completely  stable exchange  rates against those  that will. 
But since  the "scale"  of the euro is economically  neutral, this unpre- 
dictability probably is important only insofar as it prevents early public 
familiarity  with calculations  in euro. 
Bilateral  Stage  Three  conversion  factors-the  implicit  exchange 
rates between  national currencies-are  much more important. But un- 
der the Maastricht and Madrid decisions,  bilateral Stage Three conver- 
sion factors for EMU member currencies are constrained to equal final 
Stage Two bilateral market exchange  rates. If the deutsche mark value 
of an ECU at the end of Stage Two must equal the deutsche mark value 
of a euro at the start of Stage Three, and if the same relationship holds 
for French franc values,  then triangular exchange  market arbitrage on 
December  31,  1998 would imply that the implicit  Stage Three conver- 
80.  Council of the European  Communities  (1992, article 1091[4]).  The European 
Currency  Unit is a basket  of fixed amounts  of all EU member  currencies  other  than  those 
of Austria,  Finland,  and  Sweden, which  entered  the union  in 1995. The Maastricht  treaty 
also refers  to the single currency  as the ECU. 
81.  Council of the European  Communities,  "Madrid  European  Council, 15 and 16 
December  1995, Presidency  Conclusions," chap. 1, sect. A.L(6),  available  on the world- 
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sion rate between  marks and francs equal their closing  December  31, 
1998 market exchange  rate. 
Given  this constraint,  some  observers  have recommended  "letting 
markets decide"  on  Stage  Three bilateral conversion  factors.  Under 
that scenario,  the national central banks of prospective EMU members 
would  intervene  only  minimally  after May  1998,  allowing  exchange 
rates to find their equilibrium levels.  The resulting December 31,  1998 
bilateral market exchange rates would then become bilateral conversion 
factors for Stage Three. Even if markets can be trusted to price curren- 
cies rationally,  however,  the mere fact that bilateral exchange rates are 
to  be  frozen  at current levels  at the  end  of  Stage  Two  will  inhibit 
stabilizing  speculation  and make rates more volatile,  especially  in the 
last days of  1998.  Furthermore, exchange  rates are never truly exoge- 
nous. The desire for a competitive  advantage at the start of Stage Three 
would give each government an incentive to drive its currency down in 
the foreign exchange  market toward the end of Stage Two.  Competitive 
depreciation  would cause political  as well  as market tensions. 
Thus there are strong reasons for participating governments to agree 
in advance on the bilateral rates that they will  formally set at the start 
of  1999.  Indeed,  in  September  1997  the  Ecofin  Council  decided  to 
announce  bilateral  Stage  Three  conversion  rates soon  after the  May 
1998 determination of initial EMU members.82 The question will  then 
be how,  and whether,  the first-round EMU members can guide market 
rates to the desired levels  over the final months of  1998. 
EU leaders might trust in stabilizing speculation to drive market rates 
to these announced levels  in time for Stage Three. Unfortunately,  that 
strategy cannot be fully credible,  because the Maastricht treaty and the 
Madrid Council  decision  require that the market outcome be accepted, 
whatever  it  is.  And  the  treaty's  provisions  concerning  EMU  cannot 
easily be amended. To reopen the discussion  of EMU would be to invite 
conflicting  attempts to redesign  the single  currency,  in particular, by 
France and Germany.  Any resulting agreement would require ratifica- 
tion  by  all  fifteen  EU  members.  Revising  the  treaty thus  would  be 
tantamount to postponing  EMU. 
82.  Even though the December  31,  1998 exchange rates between participating  na- 
tional currencies  and the ECU are likely to be unpredictable,  bilateral  exchange rates 
between these currencies  on that date could, in principle, be perfectly  predictable;  for 
example, if set by central  bank  intervention. Maurice ObsMfeld  299 
The only option is for some form of intensified monetary cooperation 
to begin  before  Stage  Three,  with  national central banks guiding  the 
future EMU members' bilateral exchange rates toward mutually agreed 
levels.  Since  the ECB will  not yet control national monetary policies, 
however,  a system  of narrow spot exchange  rate targets in Stage Two 
could be vulnerable to speculative attack. The imminence of EMU could 
enhance the credibility  of the participating authorities and make avail- 
able some attractive technical  intervention options.  But any number of 
shocks-ranging  from devaluations  of "out"  currencies to macroeco- 
nomic  easing  by  the  "ins"  to  a  German political  or  constitutional 
crisis-could  frustrate efforts  to start Stage Three at the promised ex- 
change rates. So conspicuous  a policy  failure would not inspire public 
faith in the future of the single  currency. 
Conclusion 
The most plausible alternative scenarios appear to be either that EMU 
will  be  delayed  or  that  it  will  encompass  a  broad group  of  eleven 
countries: the core bloc consisting  of France, Germany, Benelux,  and 
Austria, and also Portugal, Spain, and Italy to the south, Ireland to the 
west,  and Finland to the north. Right now,  a broad EMU launched on 
January 1, 1999 seems likely.  The 1997 public deficits of Germany and 
France probably will  not furnish strong grounds for excluding  any of 
the countries  listed.  All  fifteen  countries  in the EU  will  bargain and 
vote  over the EMU roster early in  1998.  Germany and its close  allies 
(excluding  France) simply do not have enough voting weight to dictate 
the outcome.  France must be included in EMU, and its public borrowing 
overrun will  legitimize  loose  interpretations of  the Maastricht deficit 
criterion. Were France excluded,  EMU would lose the political  anchor 
of the Franco-German alliance that has driven European integration for 
nearly half a century. 
A  broad EMU,  however,  will  be  more  vulnerable  to  asymmetric 
shocks and disputes over macroeconomic  policies  than a narrow union. 
These  are real  costs,  although  they  might  be  mitigated  over  time  if 
EMU induces  a serious reshaping of European social  policy.  A broad 
EMU does not necessarily  imply a soft euro, even  if Italy is in. There 
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and the bank's independence offers some insulation from political pres- 
sures.  But if there were a soft euro,  it would undermine the gains that 
EU  members have  made  in reducing  inflation.  To  be  set  against  the 
possible  economic  costs  of EMU are the economic  benefits,  which are 
also  real,  but exceedingly  difficult  to  model  or quantify.  If  the  EU 
countries that do not initially  enter EMU prosper relative to those that 
have joined,  EMU could fall apart. The successor regime is difficult to 
predict. 
European economic  integration has always  been a politically  moti- 
vated enterprise. And at the moment, the political costs of not proceed- 
ing with EMU bulk so large that Europe's leaders are desperate to start 
on  time.  But  while  the  noneconomic  motives  behind  EMU  may  be 
laudable,  any political  achievements  will  be  imperiled  if  electorates 
perceive  the  economic  consequences  as  negative.  As  the  preface  to 
"One  Market, One Money"  puts it: "The Community has thus estab- 
lished  its agenda with clarity and precision.  It is an agenda of historic 
importance.  While  the  content  of  the  agenda  is  both  economic  and 
political,  the whole  process  will  stand or fall on the basis of the func- 
tional  qualities  of  the economic  and monetary union. "83  The uneasy 
coexistence  of  the  political  and economic  objectives  of  EMU  is  the 
major dilemma  facing  Europe after a remarkable half-century  of pro- 
gressive  unification.  If EMU  succeeds  on its economics,  the political 
vision  that gave  birth to  the  project  will  be  well  served.  Economic 
success  is possible,  but it is by no means assured. 
83.  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1990, p. 5). Comments 
and Discussion 
Alberto  Alesina:  This is an excellent  and very exhaustive paper, and I 
very much agree with its message.  European monetary union is a gam- 
ble.  In fact,  I am more pessimistic  than Maurice Obstfeld: in my opin- 
ion,  it is a gamble that should not be taken. In this comment,  I address 
a few points already touched on in the paper and make some additional 
observations. 
IS  EUROPE  OF  THE  OPTIMAL  SIZE  FOR  A  COUNTRY?  Probably not.  "Eu- 
rope"  (meaning the potential members of EMU) will never be a nation 
state, but it may come close  to being a federal nation state. Many argue 
(correctly) that some form of political  union is necessary for monetary 
union to be sustainable.  Others take the even stronger line that monetary 
union is merely a step toward the real goal of European political union. 
I  would  argue  that  this  is  contrary  to  history.  In  1946  there  were 
74  countries  in the world and today there are 192.  More than half of 
these countries  are smaller than Massachusetts.  In 1995,  87 countries 
had fewer than 5 million  inhabitants. 
One can think of the equilibrium size of a country as the result of a 
trade-off.  On the one hand, small countries have the benefits of a low 
degree of conflict and relative convergence  of preferences.  On the other 
hand, large countries have several advantages,  including economies  of 
scale  in the provision  of public  goods,  insurance against shocks,  and 
market size.  However,  as world trade becomes  more open,  one of the 
main benefits of a large country becomes  much less important. A coun- 
try does  not have  to be big  to be  open.  Thus the tendency  toward a 
reduction  in  average  country  size  is  perfectly  understandable  in  an 
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environment of trade liberalization.  Why would a country want to lock 
itself  in  a political  union  when  it could  be  small,  enjoy  freedom  of 
political  choice,  and trade peacefully  with the rest of the world? There 
is no need for political  integration when there is economic  integration. 
Indeed,  as I argue elsewhere  with Enrico Spolaore  and Romain Wac- 
ziarg, economic  integration should go hand in hand with political  sep- 
aratism. ' Europe is going  in exactly  the opposite  direction. 
IS  EUROPE  AN  OPTIMAL  CURRENCY  AREA?  Almost certainly not. Obst- 
feld  deals extensively  with this point in the paper. My reading of the 
evidence  is  that the pure economic  benefits  of  a European monetary 
union are probably fairly small and the costs-which  are very hard to 
measure-could  be quite large.  This in the sense  in which I think it is 
not a gamble  worth taking.  The benefits  of  monetary union  are well 
known: smaller transaction costs,  less exchange  rate volatility,  greater 
credibility.  The paper argues that for a variety of reasons,  these bene- 
fits, except  perhaps the last, are not very large. Nevertheless,  Obstfeld 
notes that the asymmetry of economic  shocks  in Europe is a source of 
concern.  It is possible,  however,  that the countries with the most asym- 
metric shocks are also those with the most to gain in terms of credibility 
in monetary policy.  This is a point worth investigating.2 
The paper also  correctly emphasizes  the role of labor mobility  in a 
monetary union.  As is well known,  labor is not very mobile in Europe. 
Blanchard  and Lawrence  Katz  show  that labor mobility  within  each 
country in Europe is lower  than that within the United  States.3 Labor 
mobility  across European countries is even  lower.  It should be recog- 
nized that labor mobility may have high utility costs in Europe, although 
these never enter into standard cost-benefit  analyses.  That labor mobil- 
ity  within  a currency  area that includes  very  strong cultural and lin- 
guistic  differences  is costly,  relates to my point that the optimal size of 
countries  is a function of cultural homogeneity. 
I would  like  to  clarify  one  of  the few  issues  that Obstfeld  leaves 
unclear: what is the alternative to monetary union? The paper seems to 
predict that if monetary union does not materialize, Europe will go back 
to a system  of fixed adjustable exchange  rates, which most likely  will 
require restrictions on capital mobility.  This would be a worse scenario 
1.  Alesina,  Spolaore,  and Wacziarg (1997). 
2.  For some evidence  on this point,  see Alesina  and Grilli (1992). 
3.  Blanchard and Katz (1992). Maurice ObsMfeld  303 
than either monetary union or flexible  rates. Thus in my opinion,  the 
only reasonable  long-run alternative to monetary union is flexible  ex- 
change rates, with free mobility  of goods  and factors of production. 
IS  EMU  USEFUL  FOR  ENFORCING  CONVERGENCE  CRITERIA?  First,  sup- 
pose  that EMU is a bad idea because  of the structural arguments dis- 
cussed  above,  which  boil  down  to the fact  Europe is  not an optimal 
currency  area.  This  proposition  implies  that it  is  good  to  adopt  the 
wrong  monetary system  (perhaps for generations  to come)  simply  in 
order to help a few  countries to reduce inflation and budget deficits at 
one particular point in time.  This strikes me as a major overvaluation 
of  short-term gains  relative  to long-run costs.  Either EMU is  a good 
idea as a monetary system or it is not; convergence  criteria are means, 
not goals. 
Second,  the convergence  criteria for fiscal policy,  which have proven 
to be the most  challenging  and controversial,  have had both positive 
and negative  effects.  They probably have created incentives  for some 
countries  to  reduce  deficits  more quickly  that they  would  otherwise 
have done. However,  the fiscal criteria overemphasize  deficit reduction 
measures  and do not pay enough  attention to levels  of  spending  and 
taxation.  As  a  result,  too  much  of  the  adjustment has  been  on  the 
revenue side.  For many countries in continental Europe, the real prob- 
lem is not overly  large budget deficits,  but an excessively  burdensome 
welfare  state that requires very  high  taxes.  Moreover,  one  must ask 
whether these convergence  criteria are necessary  for monetary union. 
Third, it is possible  that most countries would have adjusted without 
EMU.  There are two  pieces  of  evidence  in favor of  this view.  When 
inflation was brought down sharply in the EMS countries,  in the early 
and mid-1980s,  inflation was coming down throughout the OECD. The 
countries in the EMS did no better than those that were not. And many 
other countries  around the  world  have  adjusted their fiscal  balances 
during  the  past  decade.  While  I do  not  deny  that  the  progress  of 
monetary unification  and the Maastricht agreement  may have  helped 
European countries to adjust, it is not at all clear how much they have 
done so. 
IS  EMU  USEFUL  FOR  ENFORCING  PEACE  IN  EUROPE?  It is often said, both 
by the press and in academia,  that the economic  costs  and benefits of 
EMU are trivial compared with the true political advantage of European 
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that led to the two world wars. I find this argument unconvincing,  and 
possibly  wrong.  One could argue that the likelihood  of escalating  con- 
flicts might actually  increase  if several countries are forced to coordi- 
nate  policies  and  compromise  on  various  issues  for  the  sake  of  an 
unnecessary  monetary union.  A system  of free trade accompanied  by 
national  independence  in the choice  of  policy  may be  best  suited  to 
promote peaceful  interactions.  At the very  least,  this reasoning  is  as 
convincing  as the opposite.  I would also note that over the past twenty 
years,  animosity  amongst western European countries has rarely been 
as high as in recent months, when monetary union is becoming a reality. 
Finally,  I come  to my only  nontrivial disagreement  with the paper. 
Obstfeld  points out that Europe's  biggest  problem is the lack of labor 
flexibility,  and that the introduction of EMU might help in this respect. 
The  reasoning-which  is  not  fully  spelled  out  in  the paper-is  that 
labor unions  will  accept  more labor flexibility  to compensate  for the 
fact that the exchange  rate can no longer serve as a channel for adjust- 
ment. That is a reasonable,  but slightly  optimistic,  view.  Another pos- 
sibility  is  that labor unions  will  react strongly  against  the  monetary 
rigidity imposed by monetary union, without yielding  on labor flexibil- 
ity. This could aggravate social tensions and increase political  conflict, 
both within  and across  countries,  leading  some  countries to leave  the 
monetary union.  Such an event would have very serious consequences 
for the credibility  not only of the countries that leave,  but of the entire 
project. 
I would note that in the recent progress toward European unification, 
voters  have  often  been  less  enthusiastic  than their politicians.  This 
observation  raises some doubts about the political  sustainability of the 
process  and indicates  that,  in this  case,  the citizens  of  Europe have 
been more prudent than their leaders. 
Richard  N.  Cooper:  This is an admirable paper. It is comprehensive, 
thoughtful,  and judicious.  I agree with much of it. However,  as a whole, 
it leaves  me slightly uncomfortable.  Without precisely  saying so, Obst- 
feld  gives  the impression  that currency union in Europe is a bad idea; 
but that if EMU is going ahead, as it is likely to, the Maastricht treaty- 
in particular, its fiscal provisions-  is, on balance, beneficial.  I believe, 
in contrast,  that the objective  of  monetary union in Europe is a good 
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treaty-at  least,  its monetary and fiscal provisions  (some  parts of the 
treaty do not concern EMU)-is  fundamentally misguided. 
With respect to the objective  of monetary union,  I would start with 
the  observation  that the  economics  profession  typically  relies  on  an 
extraordinarily primitive  theory of  money.  The classic  dichotomy  be- 
tween real and nominal variables has served us well  both analytically 
and  in  the  classroom.  But  if  we  assume  that our  theory  of  money 
seriously  reflects the real world,  we risk getting things fundamentally 
wrong.  Many economists  believe  that. For instance,  Obstfeld  writes: 
"The  most striking contribution of the monetary unification process to 
economic  efficiency  is, perhaps, to have forced inflation into remission 
in a large number of European countries that seemed  locked in its grip 
at the  start of  the  1980s."  There is  neither theoretical  nor empirical 
support for that statement. One is not talking about Argentina, or Brazil, 
or Turkey, but about having reduced European inflation rates from 7 or 
4 percent to 2 percent. Where does the idea of big increases in economic 
efficiency  come  from? 
And yet,  Obstfeld may be correct. Many economists  have an uneas- 
iness about inflation-even  expected  inflation-that  simply is not sup- 
ported by standard monetary theories or empirical evidence.  I suspect 
that this  uneasiness  arises  from  the  feared  loss  of  efficiency  in  the 
transmission of information in a complex economy  when the price level 
is  rising  persistently. 
However,  the uneasiness  about inflation ought also to apply to flex- 
ible exchange  rates between  countries that are closely  integrated eco- 
nomically-they  stand or fall  together.  There  is  an important piece 
missing  in economic  argumentation on the costs associated  with fixing 
exchange  rates,  such  as in Obstfeld's  paper,  the same  missing  piece 
that accounts for the discrepancy between economists'  theories and their 
feelings  about inflation.  In European economies,  tradable goods  and 
services  account for over half of consumer spending and even more of 
business  spending.  The  informational  costs  of  fluctuating  exchange 
rates  may  be  greater than those  of  inflation.  In addition  to  causing 
difficult-to-interpret variations in the prices of individual goods,  due to 
differing  short-run markup practices,  they  also  result  in  movements 
between the prices of tradables as a group and nontradables as a group. 
Incidentally,  the  conventional  line  of  reasoning  suggests  that one 
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States.  It is not obvious  that the fifty states make an optimal currency 
area. There are some examples,  such as Texas  in the early  1980s  and 
New  England  in  the  late  1980s,  of  circumstances  in  which  flexible 
exchange  rates would have had desirable macroeconomic  regional ef- 
fects.  But I do not observe economists  seriously proposing such a plan. 
Is Europe an optimal  currency area? Almost  certainly  not.  But on 
some dimensions,  it may not be as far away as Obstfeld suggests.  Take, 
for  example,  the  pattern of  shocks  discussed  in  the  paper.  I would 
conjecture that among these European countries,  most of the asymmet- 
ric shocks  are monetary in origin,  either directly or indirectly.  If their 
monetary independence  is eliminated,  that source of shock disappears. 
Most of these countries are highly  diversified  in production and trade, 
so  industry-specific  shocks  should  be  well  distributed,  both between 
and within countries,  and should not be a major source of asymmetric 
shock  at the  macroeconomic  level.  Finland  is  a possible  exception, 
given  its  heavy  dependence  on  forestry  products,  and therefore,  on 
economic  grounds,  it perhaps should not hasten to join  the monetary 
union. 
Much has been made of the low  level  of labor mobility  in Europe. 
The actual movement of labor within European countries-Germany  is 
the example  given  in the paper-has  been quite low.  I would  like  to 
make two observations.  First, one should not confuse  movement  with 
mobility.  Mobility  in Germany has not been tested because the pattern 
of national wage-setting  has left workers with little incentive  to move. 
Unemployment  benefits are high,  and significant regional wage differ- 
entials are not allowed  (even the former East Germany after unification 
was targeted to reach west  German wages  within a few  years,  despite 
its much lower productivity).  So,  while one observes  little movement, 
mobility  is an unknown factor. 
Potential  mobility  is  much  higher  than Obstfeld  suggests,  mainly 
because  of the large number of foreign workers in Europe. Seven per- 
cent  of  the  German population  is  foreign,  not counting  the  Bosnian 
refugees  of the past few  years; the percentage of the labor force  must 
be still higher. These are Turks, Yugoslavs,  Greeks, Portuguese.  They 
do not have deep cultural roots in the places  where they are working, 
so  they  may  be  willing  to  move  not  only  within  but  also  between 
countries,  if they are given  adequate financial incentive  to do so.  It is 
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mobile may be sufficient to handle the asymmetric shocks that are likely 
to take place within a European currency union. 
In regard to the Maastricht treaty as the instrument with  which  to 
achieve  European monetary union,  my main objection  has to do with 
democratic theory-specifically,  the lack of accountability  of the pro- 
posed Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Both the Fed- 
eral Reserve and the Bundesbank are meaningfully  independent central 
banks,  but both are part of a broader political  process,  accountable to 
the  legislature.  The  Maastricht  treaty takes  the  Governing  Council, 
whose  decisions  will  affect  millions  of  people,  out  of  the  political 
process altogether.  I view that as a scandalous dereliction,  greatly wid- 
ening the democratic gap in the European Union. 
With respect to the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht treaty, I forecast 
in January 1992-the  month after the treaty was agreed and before  it 
was actually signed-that  if Europe took the fiscal criteria seriously,  it 
would condemn itself  to a decade of economic  stagnation.  Half of that 
decade has now gone by and, unhappily,  my forecast has so far proved 
correct.  To  tie  fiscal  policy  down  removes  one  of  a region's  major 
defenses  against asymmetrical shocks,  namely,  regionally adaptive fis- 
cal  policy.  In moving  to  currency  union,  Europeans  are necessarily 
tying their hands regionally on monetary policy.  Through the Maastricht 
treaty, and even  more so with the subsequently  agreed Stability  Pact, 
they are tying their hands regionally  also on fiscal policy.  This seems 
to me to be a mistake of the first order. 
Obstfeld,  by contrast,  sees  some  merit in the tight fiscal criteria.  I 
want to take up the four arguments that he puts forward concerning the 
threats to the European Union of excessive  fiscal deficits. None of them, 
he recognizes,  is compelling  by itself,  so one must come to a judgment 
about their collective  merit. 
First, Obstfeld suggests  that heavily  indebted countries might lobby 
for surprise inflation to reduce their real debts. This idea is,  I think, an 
economist's  plaything.  My knowledge  is not comprehensive,  but I do 
not know of any government  that has deliberately  engineered  high in- 
flation in order to reduce the real value of outstanding debt.  That has 
frequently been the consequence  of high inflation, but the inflation itself 
has  usually  been  associated  with  some  external  shock  that was  not 
handled well  or an internal policy  failure involving  conflict over taxes 
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Second,  Obstfeld argues that "other potential coordination failures 
in EMU  could  be  mitigated  by  fiscal  constraints  .  .  .  . In a floating  rate 
system,  countries  might be deterred from fiscal expansion  by the fear 
of  appreciating  their currencies  and squeezing  the tradables sector." 
Although  any economist  who has studied the Mundell-Fleming  model 
understands this proposition-and  there actually have been two impor- 
tant examples,  the United States in the early 1980s and Germany in the 
early  1990s-most  "markets"  (that is,  practical people  and officials) 
believe  that excessive  budget deficits  lead to currency depreciation.  I 
accept the Mundell-Fleming  result under certain conditions,  but Obst- 
feld is making a point about public perceptions and political  reactions. 
At least to date,  the political  perception  is that fiscal expansion  leads 
to currency depreciation,  not currency appreciation,  and therefore the 
argument cannot apply. 
Third, Obstfeld suggests that curbing national fiscal discretion might 
reduce idiosyncratic  national fiscal shocks,  mentioning three examples: 
the Johnson fiscal expansion  of  1966-67,  German unification in 1990, 
and the Reagan fiscal expansion  of  1981-83.  Play the thought experi- 
ment: would a stability pact have prevented any of these fiscal events? 
I think not. 
The Reagan administration came in with a theory that it could reduce 
taxes substantially without increasing the deficit.  Nothing in the Maas- 
tricht rules would have dissuaded the supply-siders from trying to carry 
their theories  into  practice.  I also  doubt that these  rules  would  have 
prevented President Johnson from making the defense expenditures that 
he thought necessary  to prosecute  the war in Vietnam,  or Chancellor 
Kohl from taking what, at the time, was seen as the political opportunity 
of the century to attain the long-standing  national objective  of German 
unification.  So,  while  I do not deny the general point,  I think that the 
chosen examples,  the standard cases of major fiscal malfeasance  in big 
countries in recent decades,  are misplaced  in this context. 
Fourth, Obstfeld suggests  that fiscal constraints might have the ben- 
eficial  effect  of  forcing  countries  to  scale  back  overgenerous  social 
benefit programs. The examples to date, unhappily perhaps, do not give 
any  support to  this  proposition.  The  difficulties  faced  in the  United 
States in scaling  back benefit programs are well  known.  To reduce the 
budget  deficit,  the  United  States  has  so  far raised  taxes  and mainly 
squeezed  traditional government,  not social transfers. France and Bel- Maurice ObsMfeld  309 
gium have primarily increased  taxes.  The only  country in which  one 
can see  even  a glimmer of evidence  of this proposition  is the Nether- 
lands, and there only a nibble,  not a serious bite,  has been taken out of 
social  expenditures.  Social  benefits  tend to be protected; either taxes 
go up, or other government consumption  and investment expenditures 
are reduced,  or both. 
So,  I  find  all  four  arguments  for  treaty-mandated  fiscal  restraint 
unpersuasive.  In the context of monetary union, where the central bank 
should  not be required to finance budget deficits  (thus forcing  deficit 
financing onto the capital market), the Stability Pact is a major mistake. 
Finally,  a subtheme runs through Obstfeld's  discussion  of fiscal pol- 
icy,  in essence  suggesting  that governments  are incompetent.  But  if 
one is confident that governments are incompetent at management, what 
makes  one  think that they  are competent  at making rules? There are 
some game-theoretic  arguments for making the distinction,  but I would 
venture the view  that the discussion  to date has focused  on only  one 
subset  of  possible  models,  emphasizing  current decisions.  There  is 
another subset of  "games"  that focuses  on the rule-making functions 
of  government,  and  I  conjecture  that those  would  also  find serious 
nonoptimal outcomes.  The Maastricht treaty is a perfect example. 
General  discussion:  Several  participants discussed  the role  of  fiscal 
policy  in the prospective  EMU.  Barry Eichengreen  rejected the argu- 
ment that EMU  is undesirable  because  of  the severe  restraints that it 
would place on each nation's fiscal policy.  He predicted fiscal flexibility 
would  not be  a problem because  the binding  restraints that Germany 
was trying to impose would be rejected and automatic fiscal stabilizers 
would be allowed  to operate.  Stanley Fischer believed  the risk premi- 
ums  that markets  would  apply  to  each  nation's  debt  would  help  to 
provide discipline  on fiscal policies.  N. Gregory Mankiw noted that the 
size  of such risk premiums would depend on whether it appeared fea- 
sible for a country to leave the monetary union once it had entered. To 
the degree that leaving  the union did appear a feasible  option,  market 
discipline  on  fiscal  policies  would  be  stronger.  But  in that case,  the 
advantages of fully  credible monetary union were lost. 
Christopher Sims believed  that fiscal issues  are a basic reason to be 
skeptical  of  EMU.  Confronted with a sufficiently  adverse  shock,  and 
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could find itself  in a downward spiral with interest rates rising sharply 
as markets questioned  whether its debt would be salable.  In these cir- 
cumstances,  it might opt out of the union as a final recourse.  Alterna- 
tively,  the central bank might respond by compromising  its price sta- 
bility  target, or the crisis  might be resolved  in some  other way.  Sims 
noted that a supranational fiscal  authority,  which  played  the role that 
federal fiscal policy  does  in the United  States,  could  get around such 
problems, but noted that no such institution was contemplated for EMU. 
James Tobin concurred with the need for fiscal stabilizers and with the 
problems inherent in relying  solely  on member states'  fiscal policies. 
He feared that members' fiscal policies  could be dictated by bond rating 
agencies.  He  predicted  that in response  to the diverse  problems  that 
individual  nations  are bound to encounter,  a pan-European fiscal  au- 
thority eventually  would  be  adopted  to  provide  credit  guarantees  of 
members'  debts  and other  fiscal  assistance  to  members  who  are  in 
trouble.  Cooper noted that the Brussels  budget,  amounting to about 3 
percent of  European GDP,  already provides  a form of  pan-European 
fiscal authority, though one dedicated to structural transfers related to 
the common  agricultural policy  and income  distribution rather than to 
cyclical  stabilization. 
Cooper was highly  critical of the extreme independence  and lack of 
accountability  specified  in the Maastricht treaty for the new European 
Central Bank, and of the bank's narrow charge to assure price stability. 
He  argued that the ECB  should  ultimately  be politically  accountable 
either  to  a strengthened  European  Parliament  (a  pan-European  ap- 
proach) or to the Council of Ministers (a national approach) in the way 
the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve are accountable to representative 
bodies  today.  On  the  issue  of  responsibility,  Cooper  noted  that the 
ECB's  mandate does  not even  include  assuring the functioning  of the 
payment  system  and the  stability  of  the financial  structure, let  alone 
employment  stabilization. 
Several participants offered observations favoring EMU, despite the 
doubts that had been raised about its impact on national stabilization. 
Eichengreen  argued that the slow  pace of regional adjustment that has 
been observed  within national borders could  not be applied to predict 
slow adjustment across national borders under EMU, because monetary 
union represented a regime  change  that would render past behavior a 
poor  predictor.  And  he  suggested  that the  alternative  to  EMU  was Maurice Obsifeld  311 
unattractive, reasoning that the exchange  rate stability observed among 
potential  members in recent years itself  depended  on the expectation 
that the monetary union would be formed. Robert Hall believed that the 
efficiency  gains  from conducting  business  in a single  currency would 
be substantial,  dominating  any likely  costs  to economic  stabilization 
under EMU. 
Robert Shiller  saw  the willingness  to form a monetary union  as a 
historic  watershed  in the attitudes of  Europeans.  While  the common 
currency's subordination of national monetary policy  may create prob- 
lems at first, he thought that ultimately the union would bring increased 
economic  cooperation  as well as favorable changes in wage bargaining 
and other key economic  activities.  Fischer emphasized  the importance 
of monetary union as the force chosen by Europe's leaders to drive the 
political  union.  Regarding EMU's  uncertain impact on economic  per- 
formance; he reasoned that behavior and institutions would eventually 
adapt, with more wage and price flexibility  and changes  in social  wel- 
fare and unemployment systems  substituting for the monetary rigidities 
that EMU imposed.  He acknowledged  that such adaptations could take 
a long time,  but believed  that the benefits of political  unity in Europe 
justified  any transitory economic  costs. 
Susan Collins questioned how much of the credit for slowing inflation 
should  be  given  to  the  EMS,  the  precursor to  EMU.  She  saw  little 
evidence  that EMS members did better on inflation than other countries 
in the period since  the EMS started in 1979.  In recent years, the EMS 
members had eliminated inflation, but so had the United States, Canada, 
Japan and most other industrial nations. Furthermore, she reported that 
studies of the output cost  of eliminating  inflation show no cost differ- 
ence  before  and after countries joined  the EMS.  This  suggested  that 
entering  a regime  of  monetary  discipline  could  not  be  relied  on  to 
produce  greater  wage  and price  flexibility  and other  institutional 
changes  that might improve economic  stabilization. 
Collins also raised some issues about whether EMU would last, once 
it was established.  On her reading of the past, big problems are likely 
to come  from real rather than monetary shocks  and so  would  not be 
mitigated by membership  in a monetary union.  Furthermore, because 
voters are much less  enthusiastic  about monetary union than are poli- 
cymakers,  they  may  become  impatient  with  EMU  membership  if  it 
stands in the way of dealing  with their economic  problems.  She noted 312  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1997 
that voters historically  have  seen economic  problems as national,  not 
regional responsibilities,  which may help to explain why regional prob- 
lems  are often  addressed at the national level.  But EMU provides  no 
means  for  furnishing  such  responses.  Olivier  Blanchard  agreed  that 
individual  national economies  might experience  bad economic  perfor- 
mance under EMU,  but believed  they would find it very costly to leave 
the union,  especially  if,  some time in the future, all other members of 
the European Union  were part of EMU. 
Alesina  agreed wth Collins that the history of performance under the 
EMS revealed  no benefits to member nations,  and provided no reason 
for  optimism  about  performance  under  EMU.  He  also  questioned 
whether  benefits  in  the  form  of  political  unity,  which  Fischer  had 
stressed,  would be forthcoming.  He noted that animosity among Euro- 
pean nations has risen as EMU has approached. He saw this animosity 
as the result of imposing  on nations things they did not want-a  situa- 
tion that would continue under EMU. Maurice Obstfeld  313 
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